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Introduction:
This thesis constitutes an attempt to better comprehend and understand the People’s Republic
of China (PRC) effort to consolidate territory it believed rightfully belonged to China and its implications
moving forward. China is a fascinating, complicated and confusing country. It is the most populated
country in the world with 1,349,585,8381 people, 91.5% of whom are ethnic Han Chinese. The
remaining 8.5% of the population is split amongst 55 ethnic minorities.2 While 8.5% may seem like a
small number, 8.5% of 1,349,585,838 is just under 115 million people. That is over one-third of the
population of the United States. If the 55 minorities were to be considered their own country they
would be the thirteenth most populated country in the world.3 Most of the minority population lives on
China’s periphery and were incorporated into China by the expansionistic Qing Dynasty (1644-1912).
Typically they do not speak Mandarin, the official state language of the PRC. In this regard ironically
roughly 400 million PRC citizens do not speak Mandarin either and millions of others speak it poorly.4
Millions of Han Chinese speak one of the over 1,500 dialects of Chinese, most notably Yue (Cantonese),
Wu (Shanghaineese), Minbei (Fuzhou), Minna (Hokkien-Taiwanese) along with the Xiang, Gan and Hakka
dialects. Beijing seeks to unify the citizens of the PRC through Mandarin.
China’s administrative structure is especially complicated: It had twenty-two provinces (with
Taiwan being twenty-third), five autonomous regions (Guangxi, Nei Mongol or Inner Mongolia, Ningxia,
Xinjiang Uygur, Xizang or Tibet), two special administrative regions (Hong Kong and Macau), four
municipalities (Shanghai, Beijing, Chongqing, and Tianjin), and several special economic zones. The
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PRC’s attempt to consolidate control over certain regions, most notably Xinjiang, Tibet, Hong Kong,
Macau, and Taiwan, has drawn a tremendous amount of criticism from the international community.
This thesis is a report on the PRC attempt to consolidate control over those territories as well as protect
China’s borders externally. I begin by first discussing how the century of humiliation (1839-1949)
contributed to the rise of contemporary Chinese nationalism, and the desire to create a Chinese-led
state. It would leave a haunting suspicion of treaties and a fear of the world preventing China from
claiming its rightful place in East Asia. Most importantly, the events of the century of humiliation
created a preeminence of Chinese political thought on the importance of territory.
The century of humiliation ended on October 1, 1949 with the creation of the PRC and Chairman
Mao Zedong famously exclaiming, “The Chinese people have stood up.” Following the creation of this
new state, China still had much land it needed to consolidate. I first discuss instances where the PRC has
gone to war over territorial disputes since 1949. This includes a 1962 war with India, a 1969 war with
the USSR, and a 1979 war with Vietnam. Also included is the 1950-1953 Korean War with the United
States because although it was not fought over contested territory, China entered the war to protect its
own boundaries. Through this study of external conflicts we witness that the PRC has always been the
first to engage in conflicts, through the principles Henry Kissinger calls “offensive deterrence” or
“preemptive deterrence.”5
After examining China’s defense of its external boundaries, this thesis turns to China’s attempts
to consolidate its interior. This includes the disputed territorial claims of Xinjiang, Tibet, Hong Kong and
Macau and Taiwan. Within each region I discuss China’s attempt to consolidate control over the
territory along with local resistance to PRC rule, including local nationalism. Finally this thesis examines
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China’s territorial claims to the South and East China Seas that are disputed by other states and sources
for regional tension.
The CCP’s quest to consolidate territory is not a new phenomenon in Chinese history.
Traditional Chinese culture dates back thousands of years to its roots along the banks of the Yellow River
under the legendary Yellow Emperor. The civilization gradually spread outwards as Dynasties ruled over
the Chinese civilization, rising and falling through what has been labeled the Dynastic Cycle. Rulers
would unite the Chinese people, found a dynasty and gain the mandate of heaven to rule. Eventually
the dynasty would lose the mandate of heaven when the internal Chinese system broke down. The
bloodiest conflicts throughout Chinese history always occurred as a result of the breakdown of the
internal Chinese system, thus for Chinese political leaders domestic stability and protection from foreign
invaders have been of equal concern.6 Then in the midst of this internal chaos, another ruler would
overthrow the ruling dynasty and unite the people by consolidating both power and territory; providing
a new dynasty that would claim the mandate of heaven and repeat the dynastic cycle.
The Romance of the Three Kingdoms, a famous 14th century Chinese epic-novel, begins and ends
with this continuous rhyme: “The empire, long divided, must unite: long united, must divide. Thus it has
ever been.”7 China’s first unifier is said to be Emperor Qin Shi Huang, the Qin Emperor. In 221 BC ended
the Warring States period (475-221 BC) by conquering the other Chinese states and founded the Qin
Dynasty (221-206 BC). Despite its brief reign, the Qin has a tremendous historical impact for unifying
the Chinese people and consolidating the Chinese territory under one political system. This established
the precedent for maintaining and striving for the ideals of a united “China.” Naturally from this dynasty
we derive the name “China.” The Qin Emperor also contributed to modern China by helping to begin
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construction of the Great Wall of China; his mausoleum is visited by millions of tourists every year who
travel to Xi’an to see the terracotta warriors.
In 206 BC Han Dynasty overthrew the Qin Dynasty and ruled China as a unified state for most of
the years from 206 BC-220 AD. Following the overthrow of the Han Dynasty, China was again
fragmented during the Six Dynasties period (220-618) before becoming unified by the Tang Dynasty
(618-906). This period in between the Han and Tang Dynasties featured widespread disorder. In China
periods lacking a centralized state are considered abnormal and transitional, due to the Han’s successful
four hundred year stint ruling China as a centralized state that established the political norm.8 Since
then China has been more or less unified under the Song (960-1279), Yuan (1279-1368), Ming (13681644) and Qing Dynasties (1644-1912). Although many say that China’s dynastic period is over, it can be
said that the current regime rules as the Communist, or Mao Dynasty. Chinese dynasties were not
always ruled by Han Chinese themselves; sometimes they were ruled by foreign conquerors such as the
Mongolian Yuan and the Manchurian Qing Dynasties. Unification of the Chinese people and its territory
is applauded by Chinese historians, and always arose as a result of a strong ruler consolidating the
territories of the previous dynasties. Unity and disunity of people and territory are themes of Chinese
history. This may be best summed up by the words of Chinese official Liu Ji in 2004:
The unification of China is a matter beyond dispute and bargaining. Anyone with a little
knowledge of Chinese culture knows that unification has been an essential tradition and
the basis for natural establishment throughout Chinese history. Chinese history is a
history of fighting disunity and reinforcing unity. Any person or political group that
maintains Chinese unification and territorial integrity wins the people’s support and the
appreciation of historians. Any person or political group that tries to divide China, to
surrender will be cast aside by the people and condemned from generation to
generation.9
This study of the PRC’s geographic consolidation of territory does not take place in a political or
cultural vacuum. There are larger, complex issues at stake here. First what are the borders of China?
8
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Are Xinjiang, Tibet, Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan considered within the borders of China or outside it?
Are the criteria for defining the borders of “China” politically based upon the territory that the PRC
claims, the territory within the current PRC, or the territory fully administered by the CCP? If it is based
strictly upon the territory within the PRC, then Taiwan is outside the border. If we base it upon the
territory fully administered by the CCP then Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan are outside the borders. Or
are the borders of China better defined by ethnic and linguistic boundaries than strict political borders?
Attempting to determine the borders of China means attempting to understand what it means to be
“Chinese” and to what degree Chinese identity is determined along ethnic, linguistic, religious, historical,
political and geographical lines. Traditionally reading and writing the Chinese script (but not necessarily
speaking whatever language was at Court) was essential component to be included into the Chinese
political state. Whoever mastered the written Chinese language were inside, and those who could not
were outside.10 Culture and the state have always been linked, causing Lucian Pye in 1992 to asset that
China is a “civilization pretending to be a nation-state.”
Second, what changes will come with respect to Chinese domestic politics as a result of its quest
for consolidating territory? Will more human rights be bestowed on Chinese citizens due to the
pressure to meeting existing international norms? Will China’s attempt to court Taiwan lead the PRC
towards more free-market capitalism and democracy? Will Beijing move more towards the Hong Kong
or Taiwan model? Both Hong Kong and Taiwan have become highly functioning economies and Taiwan
has evolved into a successful democracy. These societies offer models that threaten the current
method of governance used by the CCP. Most notably, Beijing has always claimed it must rule as it does
for stability, and that democracy would never work in China. However it is currently working on Taiwan.

10
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Building on the previous question, what is the CCP’s current ideology and the basis of its
legitimacy to exercise power? Although it is communist in name, the Chinese Communist Party is no
longer united by Maoist and communist ideology. Mao Zedong’s ideological policies to rapidly
transform China during the Great Leap Forward (1985-1961) and the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976)
resulted in the deaths of millions of Chinese. Following his death in 1976, China has shifted away from
Maoist policies under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping. In 1979 he opened up China to foreign
investment, seeking a more practical policy to increase China’s standard of living. This coincided with
the opening of four Special Economic Zones (Shenzhen, Zuhai, Shantou and Xiamen) along the
Southeastern coast near Hong Kong and Taiwan to experiment with free-market capitalism by attracting
overseas Chinese investment.11 In 1984 the model was determined to be successful and Beijing opened
up fourteen coastal cities to foreign direct investment (FDI). In 1988 Hainan province would become the
fifth SEZ. Since then Beijing has extended many of these economic policies to inland cities to attract
foreign investment there. Deng Xiaoping’s practical transition away from communism was best
described by his quote: “It doesn’t matter if a cat is black or white as long as it catches mice.” Clearly
the CCP’s political ideology is no longer Maoist communism, although it would be correctly labeled as
socialist.
Beijing’s drive to consolidate China’s territory also has important implications for the
international community. It has driven many to perceive China to be an aggressive state. But is this the
correct depiction, and is Chinese nationalism aggressive? Does China’s tenacity to consolidate territory
mean that Chinese nationalism is expansionistic? Recently on February 5, 2014 Benigno Aquino, the
President of the Philippines, criticized the West for not confronting China over its voiced territorial
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ambitions, and compared contemporary China to Hitler’s Nazi Germany.12 On February 19, 2014 reports
were released that US Naval intelligence analysts have determined that China is preparing its military for
a “short, sharp war” with Japan over the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands in Chinese).13 Most of the
international community’s fear of China’s territorial ambitions center on the existing disputes with other
Asian states over offshore islands within the South and East China Seas. This tour of Beijing’s attempt to
consolidate its territorial claims will help determine whether the international community should be
fearful of China’s growing power and influence.
Much has been written about fear of a “rising China.” China’s policymakers are however very
conscious of how their actions as power rising within the international system can create tension and
seek to avoid such. As Hu Jintao stated, China wants a “peaceful rise.” In 2004 the State Council
Information Office head Zhao Qizheng elaborated on this slogan by explaining that “the ‘peaceful’ is for
foreigners, the ‘rise for us.”14 From 2003 to 2006 Chinese academics studied the rise and fall of other
great powers throughout history, which was eventually aired into a twelve-part film series aired on
Chinese national television, entitled The Rise of Great Powers.15 Special attention was paid to
Germany’s rise and fall up to World War I, Japan and Germany leading up to World War II, and the fall of
the Soviet Union. From these studies China learned that it must seek a new international order by
integrating with the current order through incremental reforms and democratic international relations.
It cannot pursue a militarized path to hegemony and resource security as Germany and Japan did, nor
can it compete with the US militarily and vye for global domination as the USSR did during the Cold War.
China seeks to learn from Otto von Bismarck’s management of Germany’s rise and unification in the
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19th century and take a prudent and accommodating approach to its neighbors.16 However, despite
Bismarck’s skillful diplomacy in managing Germany’s rise and unification in the 19th century, Germany
would seemingly become the aggressor in two world wars in the 20th century.
From Beijing’s mind this is a “returning China,” a China on track to reclaim its rightful place as
the preeminent power in East Asia. After all, the Chinese name for China is zhongguo, translated to
English as “middle kingdom.” Traditionally China behaved in a fashion fitting towards its name, and
perceived itself to be at the center of the world. According to Odd Arne Westad justice, rules and
centrality are important aspects of the Chinese mindset to keep in mind when observing Chinese foreign
policy of the past, present and future.17 From the Chinese viewpoint the world has treated China
unjustly and prevented it from reclaiming what it believes to be its rightful position as a respected
power at the center of East Asian affairs. The PRC’s efforts to consolidate territory it believed rightfully
belonged to China is important to understand because it provides insight to whether China is an
aggressive state that should be feared by the international community.

16
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Century of Humiliation:
A study of China’s territorial consolidation would be incomplete without first discussing China’s
haunting memory of the “century of humiliation.” This period generally describes the period of political
upheaval and chaos in China beginning with the First Opium War in 1839 and ending on October 1, 1949
with the founding of the People’s Republic of China. On this date Mao famously exclaimed that the
“Chinese people have stood up,” effectively stating that their century of national humiliation had ended.
During this time China endured several wars with foreign powers, multiple domestic rebellions and the
protracted Civil War that ended with a Communist victory. During the century of humiliation China
would lose much of its territory through a series of “unequal treaties.” The amount of treaties that were
unequal are unknown, but they generally describe several treaties that culminated in China paying war
amenities, opening up ports for trade, conceding territory to foreign powers, and allowing for the
extraterritoriality for foreigners. From China’s perspective they were unequal because they were used
to take advantage of China’s weakness, and were not the outcome of nations negotiating as equals.
Today Chinese diplomats have an inherent mistrust of treaties due to the memory of unequal treaties
during the century of humiliation. Throughout the century of humiliation, China would be at the whim of
the imperial motives of Great Powers as they lost much of their sovereign territory to unequal treaties
that were based in international law. In addition, throughout the century China would be in a constant
state of domestic upheaval as several nationalistic rebellions attempted to overthrow the Qing Dynasty.
In 1911 the Revolutionary Alliance would succeed under the guidance of Dr. Sun Yat-sen. China
remembers the century of humiliation as a time of national humiliation during which the Chinese nation
was victimized and abused. This education is taught throughout Chinese classrooms.
The century of humiliation began with the First Opium War (1839-1842) between Great Britain
and China. The tension of the war began when in 1838 after Emperor Daoguang outlawed the opium
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trade. This was done to stop the rising Chinese opium addiction and the social problems it was causing.
He ordered Lin Zexu to enforce the ban and by mid-1839 he had arrested over 1,600 Chinese, seized
about 50,000 pounds of opium and confiscated over 70,000 opium pipes.18 He also convinced the
foreigners living in Canton to handover 20,000 chests of opium and would up sending roughly 3 million
pounds of opium to the sea. The destruction of British property led the two nations to war in the fall of
1839. The Chinese naval forces were no match for the Royal Navy. Before England could destroy the
Nanjing, a former capital city during the Ming Dynasty, China sued for peace. On August 29, 1842, the
Treaty of Nanjing would be signed, the first of many unequal treaties. The treaty called for China to pay
Mex$6 million for the destruction of British opium, ceded Hong Kong to the Queen in perpetuity, and
opened up five cities (Canton, Fuzhou, Xiamen, Ningbo and Shanghai) for British trade and residence.
The opening up of Shanghai would change China forever as this began Shanghai’s current status as an
international city with many “concession” areas being granted to foreign settlements. The next year the
British negotiated for “most-favored nation status” and the principle of “extraterritoriality” for its
subjects with the Treaty of the Bogue. Extraterritoriality would come to be despised by the Chinese as a
violation of their sovereignty. Following the British agreement, the Americans (Treaty of Wanghia) and
the French (Treaty of Whampoa) would arrange their own treaties to secure for their citizens the right
to trade in those ports and be granted extraterritoriality.
The next major event during the century of humiliation would be the Taiping Rebellion, a
domestic upheaval which involved much of China from 1850-1864. This was a rebellion primarily against
the current state of the Qing, leading future Nationalistic Chinese leaders Sun-Yet Sun and Mao Zedong
to praise the Taiping rebels for their anti-Manchu and anti-foreign spirit.19 Both leaders viewed Hong

18
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Xiuquan, the leader of the Taiping, as their predecessor in the Chinese revolutionary movement.20 Hong
Xiuquan, a radical Christian convert, believed himself to be the younger brother of Jesus Christ. By 1850
his recruits passed the 20,000 mark as he gathered his rebellion around the Thistle Mountain area in the
Southeastern province of Guangxi.21 In one attempt to gain recruits the Taiping exclaimed: “Can the
Chinese still consider themselves men? Ever since the Manchus poisoned China, the flame of
oppression has risen up to heaven, the poison of corruption has defiled the emperor’s throne, the
offensive odor has spread over the four seas, and the influence of demons has distressed the empire
while the Chinese with bowed heads and dejected spirits willing became subject and servants.”22
From Thistle Mountain they marched north and by 1853 the Taiping seized Nanjing. From 18531864 Hong would run the Heavenly Kingdom of Peace from here, with himself as the Heavenly King. The
Taiping would rule with a very radical form of Christianity that held an ascetic ban on alcohol, opium
smoking and prostitution. In 1864 the Qing would finally lay the rebellion to rest with the assistance of
western troops. They failed to overthrow the Qing due to their radicalism for which most citizens in
Nanjing resented their rule. Also, the Western powers allied with the Qing in fighting the rebellion to
prevent the Taiping from destroying Shanghai. The Taiping Rebellion helped sow the seeds for future
anti-Qing and anti-foreign nationalistic rebellions.
Simultaneous to the Taiping Rebellion, the Nian Rebellion was taking place in Northern China.
The name Nian refers to the rebels’ status as mobile bands, and the date of original insurrection is
traced to 1851. The Nian rebellion did not have a unified leadership nor did they have clear-cut
objectives or goals. The unifying factor among Nian gangs were a distaste with the ruling Qing and they
drew their recruits from poor peasants. They were poor, Han Chinese who were suffering in the
economic climate. The Qing finally suppressed the insurgency in 1868.
20
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During the Taiping and Nian rebellions the Qing were also plagued by Muslim revolts throughout
China. These revolts first began in Yunnan in 1855 in response to heavy land taxes imposed on the
Chinese Muslims, the Hui people, by the Qing. This was not a revolt against Han Chinese as the rebel
leader, Du Wenxiu, sought Han Chinese help in overthrowing the Qing. Du Wenxiu would occupy the
city of Dali creating the “Kingdom of the Pacified South” until the Manchus destroyed it in 1873. Unlike
Du’s revolt, in 1862 a Muslim revolt broke out in northwestern China due to local tensions between
Chinese and the Muslims living there. Militias broke out amongst religious and ethnic lines, Chinese
crowds burned Muslims villages and by June the Muslims were besieging the Shaanxi cities of Xi’an and
Tongzhou. This tension would finally be put to rest after Qing forces took the Gansu city of Suzhou in
November 1873. In 1873 China was finally unified under Qing rule for the first time since 1850 with the
exception of treaty ports.23 However the tremendous domestic chaos and eventual unification came at
a great cost: the China’s population declined from 410 million in 1850 to roughly 350 million in 1873.24
China would engage England again in the Second Opium War lasting from 1856-1860. The
pretext for the war resulted from the illegal Qing search of the British ship, the Arrow. The British used
this opportunity to seize Canton in 1858. By 1858 they seized the strategic Dagu forts near Beijing in
1858 with threats to invade Peking. Fearing the capital might be destroyed; China went to the
negotiating table and signed another unequal treaty, the Treaty of Tianjin of 1858. Through this treaty
the British were able to gain several concessions they desired: the right for a permanent embassy in
Peking, the practice of Christianity protected (interesting provision considering the Qing was engaged in
combating the fiercely Christian Taiping Rebellion), the immediate opening of six sea ports, the eventual
opening of four ports along the Yangtze River once the insurrection was put down, and the protection of
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travel throughout China (anywhere with passports, within thirty miles inland without passport).25 The
only British concession was the evacuate Tianjin and return the Dagu forts to the Qing. Per usual the
Americans and French followed suit with similar treaties looking to gain trading privileges.
However the Treaty of Tianjin was not the end of the Second Opium War. The Qing seemed
unwilling to abide by the terms of the treaty, leading the British to again attack the Dagu forts and
enforce the treaty terms. The Brits would lose this battle, one of the Qing’s few victories in foreign
wars. The British marched to Peking seeing to enforce the terms, and on October 18, 1860, Lord Elgin
ordered the burning of the Summer Palace to humiliate the Qing. This act humiliated the Qing
government and the Chinese people – over 150 years later this act is still viewed as an act of national
humiliation for the Chinese. The march on Peking, and the burning of the Emperor’s Summer Palace, did
effectively end the Second Opium War bringing England and China to sign another treaty. At the
“Convention of Peking,” the Treaty of Tianjin was affirmed; along with Britain receiving more war
amenities and part of the mainland Kowloon peninsula to add to its Hong Kong possession.
The Convention of Peking also featured the Russians who sought to take advantage of China’s
weakness and expand their territorial gains. While the western nations had economic ambitions
desiring trading privileges and rights, Russia and Japan had territorial ambitions on Chinese soil. The
Russians used the Convention of Peking to add-on to their territorial acquisitions acquired in the 1858
Treaty of Aigun. The Treaty of Aigun created the border along the Amur River, granting Russia all
territory north of it. All area south of the Amur that was east of the Ussuri would be jointly
administered by both countries for the time being. This granted Russia the ability to reach the Pacific.
Russia would acquire the jointly-administered area in 1860 with the Convention of Peking. This

25
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established the modern day Russia-China border. From these deals Russia gained 579,000 sq. miles and
further humiliated the Chinese nation.
It is amazing that the Qing Dynasty was able endure foreign wars and domestic upheaval from
1839-1873 and not collapse. However, the Qing would last until 1912 and the century of humiliation
would only get worse. Much of this is due to Imperial Japan’s territorial ambitions following
Commodore Matthew Perry’s famous trip to open up Japan. Japan quickly learned it was behind the
Western world and launched the Meiji Restoration in 1868 to improve its power. In 1879 Japan annexed
the Ryukyu Island Chain which China also claimed and set out to annex Korea as well. Korea may have
suffered the same fate in the 1880s but Chinese diplomat Li Hongzhang convinced the Korean King to
sign treaties with the Western nations to check Japan. Li’s reasoning was that the Western nations had
economic ambitions that although they might bring the “corrupting influences” of Opium and
Christianity they did not have the territorial ambitions of the expansionist Japanese state. Nonetheless
China and Japan would find themselves competing for influence in Korea following the outbreak of
rebellion in 1894. Both countries sent troops, but Japan was able to seize the king and install a puppet
pro-Japanese government. This launched Japan and China into war.
The Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895 was a brief war that featured a total domination by the
Japanese forces. This was the direct result of Japan’s commitment to modern military force, and China’s
recent turbulence during the century of humiliation. The Japanese navy destroyed China’s within hours
because the funds set aside for China’s Navy had been reallocated to reconstruct the Summer Palace
which the British destroyed.26 The Treaty of Shimonoseki would end the hostilities, but it would be
remembered as another unequal, humiliating treaty. The treaty would have been more humiliating had
a Japanese assassin not shot Li Hongzhang below the left eye during the negotiations. This caused Japan
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to demand less to save its international standing. Nonetheless Li’s name, and the treaty, would go down
in infamy. China ceded Taiwan, the Pescadores and the Liaodong region to Japan; recognized Korea’s as
autonomous protectorate of Japan independence; opened up four ports to trade; and paid massive war
indemnities to Japan. The Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, the island chain currently in dispute between both
states, would also be recognized as Japan’s. However within a week of the treaty a Russian-led “triple
intervention” by Russia, Germany and France would return the Liaodong Peninsula to China. At the
peninsula’s tip lay the strategic port of Port Arthur (Lushun) that the Great Powers did not want falling
into Japanese hands.
The Sino-Japanese War ushered in a new era of the century of humiliation. The years of 18981899 brought intense pressure on the Qing by the imperial powers. In 1898 Russia acquired a
renewable lease on Port Arthur which finally gave Russia it’s deeply desired “warm-water port” while
increasing its influence over Manchuria. Russia would fortify the port while also sending troops to
protect its investment of the Trans-Siberian Railway. This competition for influence in Manchuria with
Japan would prompt the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905. Germany would use an attack on its
missionaries as a pretext to seize the Shandong port city of Qingdao and claim mining and railway rights
in the surrounding countryside. Germany’s influence in Qingdao lives today in the form of the Chinese
beer Tsingtao. Arguably China’s most popular beer and the number one Chinese beer in the United
States, owes its origins to the German and English settlers who founded the Tsingtao Brewery there in
1903. The British would also occupy part of Shandong by attacking the harbor at Weihaiwei. The British
were able to obtain a lease on the port of Weihaiwei, which was opposite the Russian port of Port
Arthur, while also obtaining a 99-year lease on the fertile farmland on the Kowloon Peninsula known as
the “New Territories.” The British would administer the New Territories until the lease ran out and
returned the land to China in 1997. During this time France would also secure its influence in Vietnam
from Chinese influence.
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The events of the late 19th century greatly influenced nationalism within China. One
manifestation of this was the strong anti-foreign sentiment of the Boxer Rebellion. The Boxer Rebellion
differed from the ones experienced during the Nian, Taiping and Muslim rebellions 25-50 years earlier.
Those movements directed their hatred at the Manchu led Qing Dynasty, not at the foreign powers
involved in China. However, the Boxer Rebellion blamed China’s weakness more on the imperial foreign
powers taking advantage of China. The Boxer Rebellion drew its name from the secret-society called
The Boxers United in Righteousness who emerged as an anti-foreign force in Shandong in 1898. Many
Boxers believed themselves to be invisible to bullets as a result of martial arts practice. As noted above
the province of Shandong was carved up by foreign powers in the years prior to the Boxer Rebellion.
Like many rebellions in years prior, they lacked unified leadership to achieve their end goals, but were
united by a zealotry anti-foreign fever. Anything foreign or symbolic of the foreign presence would be
attacked: diplomats, missionaries, Chinese Christian converts, western schools, and railroad and
telegraph lines were all attacked.27 They were however not anti-Qing, so Empress Dowager on June 21,
1900, praised the Boxers and issued a Declaration of War against the foreign powers which included the
following: “The foreigners have been aggressive toward us, infringed upon our territorial integrity,
trampled our people under their feet… They oppress our people and blaspheme our gods. The common
people suffer greatly at their hands, and each one of them is vengeful. Thus it is that the brave
followers of the Boxers have been burning churches and killing Christians.”28
Following Empress Dowager’s Declaration of War, China naturally entered a war against all
foreign powers with interests in China. Lucky for the foreign powers the Boxer rebellion lacked strong
leadership and not a large number of Qing troops joined in the attack. Had that happened, more
Westerners would be killed. Instead a foreign power expeditionary forces consisting of 20,000 troops
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mostly from Japan, Russia, Britain, United States and France, but also hailing from Germany, AustriaHungary and Italy, arrived in Peking in August 1900 to aid the foreign embassies under attack. They
were able to suppress the rebellion and negotiate another unequal treaty with Li Hongzhang in 1901.
This peace treaty, known as the Boxer Protocol, forced China to pay more war amenities to the foreign
powers, construct monuments in memory of the over 200 Westerners dead, and banned for five years
any civil service examinations were anti-foreign atrocities took place.
The next nationalistic revolution would be led by Dr. Sun Yat-sen, the father of Modern Chinese
nationalism. He led China’s new search for self-identity that help overthrow the Manchu Dynasty and
begin China’s era as a nation-state. He is honored in China for his contribution to nationalism and the
creation of a new era in Chinese history where the Chinese ruled themselves. His memory lives on at Dr.
Sun Yat-sen’s Mausoleum in Nanjing, China where he is buried and his former residence in Shanghai,
China. The Museum in Shanghai goes into great detail to describe the century of humiliation, the
unequal treaties, and Dr. Sun Yat-sen’s effort to restore Chinese pride by overthrowing the Manchu Qing
Dynasty that kept China weak. Unlike the Boxers, Sun nationalism did not manifest itself in any antiforeign zeal. In fact, he was a converted Christian who had spent many years in the West and dreamed
of turning China into a republic based upon the model of Western governments. Sun would go on to
become the First President of the Republic of China in 1912, transitioning China from an empire to a
nation-state. Doing so he declared China a multiethnic state populated by the Han majority and the four
main ethnic minorities: the Tibetans, the Mongols, the Manchus, and the Hui (inclusive term for all
Chinese Muslims at the time).29 Modern China retains the concept of being a multiethnic state,
although today there are fifty-five nationally recognized majorities along with the Han majority.
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Dr. Sun Yet-sun led the Revolutionary Alliance, an affiliation of many anti-Qing groups
committed to overthrowing the Qing Dynasty by force. While the Chinese people were divided about
what political and economic system they should replace the Qing with, it was clear that the Chinese
people expressed a strong sentiment to restore themselves as rulers of their own territory. The
Revolutionary Alliance was created in 1905 in Tokyo and led a series of uprisings from 1906-1911 that
were all suppressed by the Qing.30 However the movement would continue to fight due to the strong
mood of nationalism that devoured China, and Dr. Sun Yat-sen’s persistence to overthrow the Qing. By
the summer of 1911 the number of active Revolutionary members reached 10,000 a tremendous
growth from its humble beginnings of 400 in 1905.31 The successful revolution would outbreak after an
accident explosion in Hankou on October 9, 1911 while Dr. Sun Yat-sen was in the United States
fundraising for the revolution. The revolution then moved entirely too quickly to be controlled by any
individual or political party.32 Nonetheless, Dr. Sun Yat-sen would return to China in December to be
elected Provincial President of the New Chinese Republic on December 29, 1911. He would assume
office in Nanjing at the start of the New Year, but the Qing had still not abdicated the throne: for the
first 6 weeks of 1912 China had both a Republican President and a Manchu emperor. The two sides
conducted negotiations until the emperor abdicated the throne on February 12, 1912. In return Dr. Sun
Yat-sen resigned as President and gave presidential powers to the former premier of the Qing Dynasty,
Yuan Shikai. Dr. Sun Yet-san knew that although his influence was strong and contagious, he lacked a
power base amongst the military and it seemed Yuan Shikai was the only individual capable of unifying
the country. The Revolutionary Alliance hoped Yuan would continue to rule from Nanjing, but he
decided to keep the capital in Peking. So in 1912 China embarked on its first series of Chinese self-rule
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since the Ming Dynasty fell in 1644. This proved to be a daunting task, and the century of humiliation
was far from over.
The new Republican government held elections for the National Assembly in December 1912. In
preparation for this Sun transformed the Revolutionary Alliance into a political party known as the
National People’s Party of the Kuomintang (KMT). The KMT emerged victorious in the election with its
party leader, Song Jiaoren, poised to be named Premier. However, on March 20 he would be
assassinated on a Shanghai railroad platform, and it is widely believed that Yuan Shikai was behind the
plot.33 This would lead to a series of events in 1913 in which Yuan would solidify his grip on power, ban
the KMT and exile Dr. Sun Yat-sen. Yuan would then claim himself emperor and rule until his death in
1916. His death would usher in an “era of warlordism” that plagued China for a decade. After Yuan’s
death, Sun returned to China and reestablished the KMT. Sun would be the de facto head of the KMT
until his death in 1925 handed power over to Chiang Kai-shek.
Europe became engulfed in World War I during Yuan Shikai’s reign, leaving them uninterested in
China for the time being. However, in 1914 Japan declared War on Germany (result of 1902 alliance
with England) and thus attacked the German concession areas in Shandong province. In 1915 Japan
would humiliate China by issuing the infamous “Twenty One Demands” demanding Japan get an
increase of economic control over Manchuria and other parts of China. China then came to the
conclusion that if they entered the war effort on the Allies side they would be able to regain the
strategic German concessions in the areas around Qingdao. In an attempt to earn favor with the allies
China sent around 100,000 laborers to Western Europe from 1916-1918. However at the Treaty of
Versailles the Great Powers agreed to give Japan the German concessions in Shandong. This again is
another example of an unequal treaty from the Chinese perspective. On May 4, 1919 a massive
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demonstration of college students publicly demonstrated against Versailles’s granting the Shandong
concessions to Japan. The date of this protest would bear the name of new nationalistic movement in
China: the May 4 movement. This movement was basically a country-wide movement with reformers
sharing a central idea of seeing a strong unified China capable of combating the problems of warlordism,
the “feudal” exploitative landlord system, and foreign imperialism.34
The intellectual beliefs of the May 4th movement laid the foundation for the creation of the
Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The CCP was founded by Chen Duxiu, and held its first meeting on July
23, 1921 in Shanghai.35 These meeting featured thirteen delegates representing different areas of
China, including a young Mao Zedong representing Hunan. The site of the first plenary meeting of the
CCP now exists as a museum in Shanghai. In 1923 the CCP aligned with a reorganized KMT that based its
ideology on Dr. Sun Yat-sen’s Three Principles of the People: anti-imperialist nationalism, democracy and
socialism. This alliance put the KMT in charge of China during the warlord era. Chiang Kai-shek would
be appointed military commander by Sun, and take over following his death. Chiang’s Northern
Expedition (1926-1928) ended in the reunification of China (more so in name than practice) and marked
the end of the warlord era. However, during the Northern expedition there would be a split in the KMTCCP alliance that sowed the seeds for the Chinese Civil War. The fracture in the alliance had its roots in
the CCP’s secret mission to push the KMT in a leftist direction. This mission involved influence from
Stalin, the Comintern and the leftist leaders within the KMT. These leaders were disgusted by Chiang’s
actions in Shanghai that April, where it appeared he was allying with the rich bourgeoisie merchants of
Shanghai. This fracture in 1927 began the twenty-two Civil War that would end in a Communist victory
and the birth of the People’s Republic of China.
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The first phase of the Chinese Civil War lasted from 1927-1937. The CCP recruited an army in
the countryside that would act as an insurgency against Chiang’s KMT. Mao operated from the belief
that a successful revolution would consist mainly of countryside peasants and not from the workers
proletariat. During this phase the famous “Long March,” became a defining moment in the history of
Chinese communism. With the Red Army weakened and on the verge of destruction, Zhou Enlai devised
a strategy for the Communists to evacuate Jiangxi Province.36 During this period Mao Zedong assumed
the military leadership and the Long March cemented his rise to power within the communist party.
The Red Army left Jiangxi province on October 16, 1934, with 80,000 troops only to arrive in Yan’an in
Shanxi Province with about 8,000 to 9,000 troops.37 They marched roughly 6,000 miles in 370 days.
While the Long March provided Communist leaders with strength and created a powerful propaganda
force, the Communists lost almost all of the territory and influence they had previously gained
throughout the Communist revolution. The Communists were not stronger at the end of the Long
March than they had been during the years of the initial split with the KMT.38 The mountains of Yan’an
would now provide the base of Communist power.
Japan’s 1937 invasion of China, and the ensuing occupation that followed, further prevented
China’s attempt to unify and create a centralized state. The period of 1937-1945 would feature an eerie
resemblance to the Warring States period before the Qin emperor first unified China in 221 BC as Japan
controlled much of Eastern China, the KMT held its power in Chongqing, the Communists controlled
Shaanxi, the Japanese allowed the Mongolians to function independently, Xinjiang was ruled by a
warlord, and the Dalai Lama ruled Tibet.39 On July 7, 1937, following an incident at the Marco Polo
Bridge, Japanese troops invaded China launching the second Sino-Japanese War. By December 13
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Japanese troops would reach the Chinese capital at Nanjing. The seven weeks that followed are
remembered as the “Rape of Nanjing” where Japanese troops ran wild through Nanjing, murdering,
looting and raping. According to historian Jonathan Spence:
The number of women who were raped, many of whom died after repeated assaults,
was estimated by foreign observers in Nanjing at 20,000; fugitive soldiers killed were
estimated at 30,000; murdered civilians at 12,000. Other contemporary estimates made
by Chinese observers were as much as ten times higher, and it is difficult to establish
exact figures.40
The period of Japanese control, more so than any period throughout the century of humiliation,
arguably left the most haunting impact on the Chinese national conscience. Japan controled much of
eastern China until it surrendered to the Allied Powers on September 2, 1945. After Japan’s surrender
China regained all of the territory Japan had acquired from China since the 1895 Treaty of Shimonoseki.
This includes Manchuria and Taiwan. China contends that the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, the islands
currently under dispute between Japan and China, were returned to China following World War II while
Japan believes they never were. The vacuum of Japanese control over China ushered in the second
phase of the civil war between the CCP and the KMT. Mao’s communists elected for a strategy of
controlling the countryside while Chiang’s KMT sought to hold the cities. Mao’s guerilla forces would
constantly disrupt the Chiang’s supply chains, weakening the importance of holding the cities. Through
a protracted war based upon wei-qi strategy Mao would emerge the victor in 1949 as Chiang’s forces
retreated to Taiwan.
On October 1, 1949, Mao Zedong proclaimed the foundation of the People’s Republic of China
and famously exclaimed that “the Chinese people have stood up.” This was an acknowledgment of the
end of China’s century of humiliation. Mao Zedong would led the journey of restoring Chinese national
pride and identity and be honored as another successful unifier of China. Chinese history applauds
those unify China that end periods of chaos and disunity. Following China’s dynastic precedent, Mao
40
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claimed the previous boundaries the Qing Dynasty held at its maximum extent. This included several
areas that were currently exercising de facto independence or administered by foreign powers: The
British controlled Hong Kong; the Portuguese administered Macau; Russia protected Mongolian
independence; The East Turkestan Republic controlled parts of Xinjiang with Russia help; the Dali Lama
operated Tibet with British help; and the KMT established the Republic of China on Taiwan. Mao
Zedong claimed all of these territories belonged to China. China would have to relinquish its claim to
Outer Mongolia and recognize the country of Mongolia due to the USSR’s insistence. China would
eventually administer the territories of Hong Kong, Macau, Inner Mongolia, Xinjiang, and Tibet. Taiwan
is another issue entirely: China claims Taiwan is still a province of China while the area maintains its de
facto independence. Many people say that the century of humiliation will not end until Taiwan is
officially reunited with the mainland.
The century of humiliation still affects Chinese nationalism today. First, it paved the way for the
modern Chinese state and nationalism. After all Dr. Sun Yat-sen is still honored as the father of Chinese
nationalism even though the political party he created fought in a Civil War against the CCP and
currently resides in Taiwan. Second it celebrates the Chinese historic theme of unifying the nation and
fighting disunity. Since 1949 the People’s Republic of China has fought disunity amongst its population
at the expense of endangering its international reputation and human rights violations. This has been
seen it its suppression of protests throughout the country including the infamous June 4, 1989
crackdown at Tiananmen Square. Also, it has caused the People’s Republic of China to encourage a
state-led nationalism and view internal critics not as dissenters but as enemies of the state. This can be
seen through the suppression of minority nationalism and ethnic-conflict within China. Third, it left
China viewing the principle of territorial integrity as the number one priority. Any attempt to take a
piece of Chinese territory away from China, or aiding a domestic separatist movement will be viewed
with suspicion. Fourth, it left China suspicious of treaties and territorial disputes. China remembers that
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it lost much of its territory through treaties with foreign powers and this makes resolving the island
disputes in the South and East China Seas very difficult. Finally, most Chinese believe that the century of
humiliation will not be fully completed until Taiwan is unified with the mainland. Any attempt to keep
Taiwan independent is partly from the Chinese perspective an attempt to keep China weak and prevent
it from reaching its full potential.
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Case Studies of China’s Border Wars:
The purpose of this chapter is to conduct case studies of times China’s has gone to war to
protect its border. Since 1949 China has gone to war three times over disputed territory: 1962 with
India, 1969 with Russia, and 1979 with Vietnam. Also included is the 1950-1953 Korean War because
although China was not fighting over disputed territory, it did engage in the conflict to protect its
border. China is especially concerned about its borders, as it shares borders with the following 14
countries: North Korea, Russia, Mongolia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan,
India, Nepal, Bhutan, Myanmar/Burma, Laos and Vietnam (China has consolidated land border with all
states except India). This leaves China naturally concerned about encirclement. Some scholars argue
Chinese strategic thinking about its borders is rooted in the ancient Chinese game wei-qi.41 One of the
main objectives of wei-qi is territorial consolidation from the outside-in, by controlling the borders.
Thus before indulging on China’s quest to consolidate its interior, we must first understand China’s
attempt to defend the borders since 1949.
Conflict with India
Today, virtually the entire 2,521 mile (4,057 km) land border is under dispute, and the total area
under dispute is roughly the size of Alabama at over 52,125 sq miles (135,000 sq km).42 However, in
1962 China and India went to war over this territory. For most of India and China’s history the two
states were separated by the Tibetan plateau that limited cultural contacts. This all changed in 1951
after the Chinese annexation of Tibet.43 The conquering of Tibet brought Tibet under CCP rule and
expanded China’s external border to India, thus placing troops on the border. Mao invaded Tibet in
October 1950 while the world attention was focused on the Korean War, and India’s leader Jawaharlal
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Nehru believed that China would not invade Tibet. Nehru was surprised by China’s aggressive moves
since he had been “led to believe by the Chinese Foreign Office that the Chinese would settle the future
of Tibet in a peaceful manner by direct negotiation with the representatives of Tibet.”44
The spread of Chinese rule to Tibet brought the disputed territory between India and China to
the forefront of their relationship. In the Easter Sector China claimed an area it considered “South
Tibet,” but India administered as the state of Arunachal Pradesh due to its interpretation of the
McMahon Line that delimited the border between Britain and Tibet in 1914. Although Chinese
representatives were present at the conference, they initialed but did not sign the document because
China believed that Tibet was still part of China; thus Tibet could not maintain its own sovereignty and
China could not acknowledge the validity of Indian Administration under the McMahon Line.45 In the
western disputed area lies the territory Aksai Chin which is administered by China, but also claimed by
India. To further complicate this issue this territory today also contains 2,000 square miles ceded to
Beijing by Pakistan, India’s rival.46 Both countries have yet to reach an agreement on these territories
but China seems to have offered twice to resolve the disputes by accepting Indian control over the
Arunachal, and India accepting the Chinese control over Aksai Chin. The first attempt being in 1959
under Zhou Enlai was preempted by the Dalai Lama’s flight to India.47 Then again in 1979 it seems Deng
Xiaoping explored the idea of each side giving up its claims with some “minor readjustments.”48
Today’s territorial tensions are strategically based. The Aksai Chin is important for China
because it contains a road linking western Tibet and western Xinjiang, and it is important for India
because it is lies to the east of the Kashmir territory disputed between India and Pakistan.49 The Aksai
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Chin is nearly inaccessible from India, thus it took India several months before it realized China was
building that road in 1955.50 The Indian administered of Arunachal Pradesh is important to both sides
because of its location and large ethnic Tibetan population. These areas were fought over in the 1962
Sino-Indian War, but failed to produce any lasting change in control. The war began on October 20,
1962, with a Chinese assault on Indian positions in disputed territory and on November 21 China
announced a unilateral ceasefire with intentions to withdraw from seized territory, ending the fighting
that left 722 Chinese and 4,885 Indian soldiers dead.51 This attack was precipitated by India’s late 1961
“Forward Policy,” that increased its military presence in the disputed territory that it held, and aimed to
prevent China from advancing further and dominate Chinese posts in already administered Indian
territory.52 This move weakened China’s claims to the territory, threatened China’s territorial integrity
and the domestic economic crisis of the Great Leap Forward magnified the assessment of the danger of
Indian actions.53 Mao’s attack was largely political and aimed at using the element of surprise to draw a
rapid conclusion to the end of the conflict. It also illustrated a theme of Chinese foreign policy: China
will not allow force to threaten its border, it will meet force with force, and once it believes war is
inevitable China will strike to gain the initiative. Mao’s premier, Zhou Enlai, stated that the war was
intended “to teach India a lesson,”54 while a Chinese diplomat claimed that Mao attacked under the goal
of deterrence and that attacking India would “create 10 years of border stability.” One lesson rings the
truest: that China will not let its territorial claims be challenged by foreign force, even if a foreign
country legally administers the territory China claims.
Conflict with USSR
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On the morning of March 2, 1969 two Chinese patrols ambushed Soviet border guards on
Zhenbao (Damansky) Island in the Ussuri River. A second clash occurred again on March 15, and by the
conflicts end China suffered 91 causalities (30 killed, 61 wounded) while the USSR suffered over 200
casualties (approximately 91 killed and 109 wounded).55 These conflicts were precipitated by rivalry for
leadership of the soviet bloc, and a buildup of force in the Russia Far East. Upon proclaiming China a
communist state in October 1949, Mao and Stalin developed a communist brother relationship but Mao
always resented being the “little brother.” Furthermore, Mao disapproved of the Soviet assertion that
they should speak for world communism. The relationship between Beijing and Moscow improved
briefly after Stalin’s death in 1953, only to get worse under Nikita Khrushchev. Mao disliked
Khrushchev’s public criticism of Stalin, his often-abrasive manner, and his attempt to improve relations
with the West.56 This relationship became malignant in 1962 following Mao’s criticism of Khrushchev in
the Cuban Missile Crisis, and his support for India in Sino-India War. After the relationship fallout,
Beijing brought up historical border disputes that had been irrelevant during the period of brotherhood
between communist leaders, and demanded that Moscow return its 19th century land acquisitions from
the Qing Empire.57 China especially disagreed that the border was determined along China’s bank of the
Ussuri, granting the USSR all islands in the river including Zhenbao (Damansky). In 1966 the USSR signed
a defense treaty with Mongolia that allowed the Soviets to deploy troops along the Mongolian-China
border which stretched 2,000 km along China’s northern frontier.58 By 1969, there were thirty-four
Soviet divisions facing China; a stark increase from the fourteen divisions facing China in 1965.59 China’s
fears about Soviet build-up were heightened by the Soviet “Brezhnev Doctrine” which the USSR claimed
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they had the right to intervene with force in any socialist state to defend socialism against
counterrevolution. In 1968 the Soviets invaded Czechoslovakia to end the Prague Spring movement to
liberalize communism, and the USSR believed the Cultural Revolution to be a form of
counterrevolution.60 Thus, China was suspicious that the USSR would use the Brezhnev Doctrine to
invade China.
The Zhenbao Island incident was very similar to the Chinese strategy launching the 1962 SinoIndian War. Fravel states that “China sought to counter what it believed to be increasing military
pressure created by a sharp decline in the local military balance and assertive Soviet behavior during a
period of domestic unrest. The goal of the Heilongjiang MD initial plan was to teach the Soviets a ‘bitter
lesson’ about the dangers of armed confrontations over disputed areas.”61 Just like in India in 1962,
China launched the attack but its purpose was defensive. Kissinger explains this aspect of Chinese
political thought as “offensive or preemptive deterrence.” He explains that this “concept involves the
use of preemptive strategy not so much to defeat the adversary militarily as to deal him a psychological
blow to cause him to desist.”62 However the offensive deterrence philosophy did not cause USSR to
immediately desist. Rather the USSR increased military pressure on China in both the eastern and
western sectors including an August 13 raid with 300 soldiers and tank tanks that resulted in the killing
of approximately twenty border guards near Tielieketi in Xinjiang.63 Soon after the USSR threatened
China with attacks on its nuclear facilities in Xinjiang. The USSR attacks in Xinjiang and its nuclear
threats gave the USSR the initiative in the conflict that China sought to create in the Zhenbao incident.
In October Mao thought the nuclear strike was so imminent that he sent all leaders (except Zhou Enlai)
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to disperse throughout China and alert China’s nuclear forces.64 Besides a strike on nuclear facilities in
Xinjiang, Soviet leaders considered a ground attack into Manchuria (located in Northeast China and the
industrial heartland of China at the time) to which China had no defense against except a “people’s
war,” so China invited Soviet premier Alexei Kosygin to Beijing to diffuse the conflict.65 These October
formal talks between Zhou Enlai and Alexey Koshyin focused solely on crisis management and not
resolving the sovereignty dispute.
With the conflict resolved, China and the USSR entered into a cold war but neither side pursued
armed conflict as it did in 1969. This period created a strategic triangle between the United States, USSR
and China that lead to Nixon’s 1972 visit to China. The US rapprochement, combined with the US effort
to end the war in Vietnam allowed China to station more troops along its northern border and focus its
efforts on the Soviet military threat and encirclement.66 Soviet encirclement began with an increase of
troops along the northern border, a growing Soviet Pacific Fleet, increased military aid to North Korea,
and a 1971 Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation with India that helped India’s modernize armed
forces.67 India was still only nine years removed from a border war with China that left territory
uncontested, and India still allowed the Dalai Lama to run a government-in-exile. The encirclement also
included a 1978 formal alliance with unified Vietnam (China’s southeastern border) that allowed
Vietnam to invade Cambodia and granted Soviet access to Cam Ranh Bay and Danang Naval Bases, and a
1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.68
Conflict with Vietnam
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In 1979 Chinese troops invaded Vietnam to “teach Vietnam a lesson” regarding border disputes,
mistreatment of ethnic Chinese, and to resist Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia.69 This was essentially the
Third Vietnam War, with the anticolonial war with France being the first war and the US-Vietnam War
the second. The build-up to this conflict began during the final days of the Second Vietnam War, as
Hanoi and Beijing competed for dominance in Indochina and Southeast Asia. Vietnam planned to
establish an Indochinese Federation during its conquest of the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia. This made
China and Vietnam inevitable enemies. In June of 1978 the Vietnamese Politburo identified China as its
“principal enemy.”70 In November 1978 the USSR and Vietnam signed the Treaty of Friendship and
Cooperation. In December Vietnam invaded Cambodia, overthrew the Khmer Rouge and installed a
Vietnamese puppet government.71 Sensing the trend turning against China, Deng Xiaoping decided to
employ their “offensive deterrence” or “preemptive deterrence” principle and strike Vietnam. The use
of this principle can best be described by Henry Kissinger: “When Chinese planners conclude that their
opponent is gaining unacceptable advantage and that the strategic trend is turning against them, they
respond by seeking to undermine the enemy’s confidence and allow China to reclaim the psychological,
if not material, upper hand.”72
On February 17, 1979 China invaded Vietnam from the Guanxi and Yunnan Provinces.73 This was
a massive military operation consisting of roughly 450,000 troops, on a similar scale of its entry into the
Korean War in November 1950.74 This invasion was similar to China’s entry in the Sino-Indian War, as
China performed its limited strike followed by a retreat.75 The war was over in twenty-nine days,
compared to the Sino-Indian War’s thirty-two day conflict. Because China was not able to force the
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Vietnamese to leave Cambodia or restore the Khmer Rouge to power while suffering heavy casualties,
many criticized (especially the western media) this operation as a major failure. It did however force
Vietnam to maintain troops along its Chinese border out of fear of another Chinese “lesson,” that
depended upon the USSR to provide capital for the logistical support because it did not have a big
enough work force.76 Thus when the fall of the Soviet Union occurred in 1989 Vietnam could no longer
support its military force, retreated from Cambodia, and paved the way for Cambodia to become an
independent state. The invasion also showed Vietnam that China could easily penetrate into Vietnam,
destroy their towns and villages at any cost, then withdraw.77 It also prevented Vietnam from invading
Thailand out of fear of another Chinese invasion, and also taught the USSR to not get involved in a longdrawn out war with China. Thus Lee Kwan Yew states that while “the western press wrote off the
Chinese punitive action as a failure. I believe it changed the history of East Asia.”78
Offshore Island Conflicts with Vietnam.
Twice China has fought with Vietnam to consolidate contested offshore islands in the South
China Sea by force. In 1974 China took the Crescent Group in the western Parcels held by South
Vietnam, and in 1988 it occupied six features in the Spratly Islands also claimed by Vietnam and the
Philippines.79 China had claimed these islands since 1951 but had lacked the naval presence to assert its
claims.80
Conflict with US: The Korean War
Although the Korean War was not fought over contested territory, it is in a sense a border war
and should be included as a case study. It helps to further understand China’s fear of encirclement and
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principles of offensive/preemptive deterrence. At the end of World War II Korea was divided along the
38th parallel into North and South Korea reflecting the limits the Soviet and American armies had
reached at the end of the war (Soviets in North and Americans in South). Before the war Korea had
been a Japanese colony. Thus Kim Il-sung of the North sought to reunify Korea into one communist
country by invading South Korea. Mao Zedong, at heart a communist revolutionary, liked the idea of a
unified communist Korea, but was unwilling to approve the invasion due to likely American intervention
and thought the Korea unification should wait until after China completed its reunification through
conquest of Taiwan.81 Kim Il-sung attacked South Korea on June 25, 1950. Truman, fearing the
expansion of communism, linked the Korean War to the Chinese civil war by sending ground forces to
Korea and ordering the US Pacific Fleet to “neutralize” the Taiwanese Straight to prevent Mao from
invading Taiwan.82 Mao determined the fleet intervention as hypocritical since Truman had promised to
not intervene over Taiwan, and Mao had been assembling forces to invade Taiwan before Truman’s
decision.83 The U.N. Security Council approved the intervention because Beijing’s seat was occupied by
Taipei, and Moscow abstained.
China began planning for a possible intervention in the Korean War immediately. Although
most people hold the view that China decided to enter the war upon the US decision to cross the 38th
parallel and MacArthur’s push towards the Yalu River, China began its debate on intervention at the
advent of American deployment. The decision to enter the war only became inevitable after the
crossing of the 38th parallel because of China’s fear of encirclement (troops along Chinese border) and
Mao’s unwillingness to let communist North Korea fall. Following the successful invasion at Inchon and
victory by U.N. Forces, on September 20 Premier Zhou Enlai outlined the principles for military action in
Korea: “The war to resist America and assist Korea should be conducted as a protracted war on the basis
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of self-reliance. In every campaign and battle, we have to gain superiority by concentrating our
manpower and firepower in order to break up and destroy the enemy. By weakening the enemy
gradually, we will be able to carry out a protracted war.”84 The decision to cross the 38th parallel was a
hotly debated topic in the State Department and Pentagon. However, most voices favored crossing the
38th parallel because it was an arbitrary line drawn of a homogenous nation.85 General Douglas
MacArthur especially favored crossing the 38th parallel and pushing towards the Yalu. At this time China
offered many warnings to the US about not crossing the 38th parallel. On October 3 Premier Zhou Enlai
issued a warning to the US through the Indian ambassador to Beijing, K.M. Panikkar, that if the US
crossed the 38th parallel China would intervene, but Secretary of State Acheson believed China was
bluffing.86 Lee Kwan Yew after discussing a conversation with Deng Xiaoping regarding Chinese foreign
policy has stated: “The Chinese had never concealed their views, and what the Chinese people said
counted. During the Korean War, China had issued a statement that if the Americans approached the
Yalu River, the Chinese people could not sit idly by. But the American’s took no notice. On foreign
policy, China always spoke what it thought.”87
On October 7, 1950, the crossing of the 38th parallel and invasion of North Korean territory was
authorized by a United Nations resolution.88 Misconceptions and misperceptions would cause the leadup to the war. Chinese leaders would not allow the United States to push towards the Yalu River which
had already been used as a traditional invasion route of China: Japan had invaded northern China from
there before World War II and the Manchurians came from the northeast to establish the Qing Dynasty.
Stalin even pledged military support to China following a US reaction towards Chinese intervention, but
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failed to stand-by his commitment he pledged towards Mao.89 Finally on October 19, 1950 Mao ordered
his army to cross into Korea with only a Soviet pledge of logistical support, and would push the United
States back until an armistice agreement was reached on July 27, 1953, again dividing North and South
Korea at the prewar line of the 38th parallel.90
Conclusion of External Conflicts:
Since the foundation of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, China has on several times used
force to protect what it is has declared its external boundaries. China has a long history of foreign
invasions that shape the decisions of Chinese political leaders. In all of China’s conflicts they used the
principle of offensive/preemptive deterrence and initiated the conflict. They also point to a sense of
justice by which China will teach other countries “a lesson.” From a western sense these conflicts seem
offensive, but they were truly defensive minded. China will not wait for foreign armies to invade; they
will strike to gain the initiative once war has been deemed inevitable. The People’s Liberation Army
(PLA)- the collective name for Chinese armed forces has autonomy in training, equipping and managing
wars but civilian leaders determine where future conflicts will arise and decide when to go to war.91
According the Nathan and Scobell “It was Mao who decided to intervene in Korea in 1950, to develop
nuclear weapons in 1955, to launch a war with India in 1962, and to ambush Soviet troops in early 1969.
Deng Xiaoping decided on the Chinese invasion of Vietnam in 1979 and on the naval clash with Vietnam
in the Spratly Islands in 1988.”92 Today, Xi Jinping will be the leader who decides when and where China
will go to war.
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Xinjiang:

93

There are challenges to preserving the unity of the Chinese people within the People’s Republic
of China. These lie in incorporating minority people’s into the Chinese idea of a united Chinese nationstate. China is roughly 91.5% Han Chinese, and the other 8.5% of the peoples come from a variety of 55
minorities. While China desires to be a multi-ethnic nation-state, it faces challenges to do so with the
minority populations. This is because China more so desires to create a united state and shows of ethnic
identity are often perceived to be threats to preserving Chinese unity. So while in theory China
attempts to be a nation state, in practice it suppresses ethnic nationalism because it is incompatible
with Beijing’s goal of returning to its rightful place as the middle kingdom.
To give ethnic minorities a sense of ethnic identity and individuality there are currently five
autonomous regions within China: Inner Mongolia (Mongolian minority), Xinjiang (Uyghur minority),
Guangxi (Zhuang minority), Ningxia (Hui minority) and Tibet (Tibetan minority). This system of granting
ethnic minorities autonomous regions derived from Stalin’s incorporation of autonomous regions into
the Soviet Union. They were different in that they were not given the theoretical ability to succeed as
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they were in the USSR.94 China is too haunted by the century of humiliation to even entertain the idea
of territories being granted their independence. Today, Xinjiang and Tibet pose a threat to China’s
state-led nationalism, unity and territorial integrity. The other three autonomous regions do not pose a
threat to China’s territorial integrity and all currently have a distinct majority Han population. While
Xinjiang and Tibet each pose threats to China’s territorial integrity and the Chinese image of a united
nation, they both do so in different manners.
China likes to promote the idea that Xinjiang has been Chinese territory without interruption
since the Han dynasty. This, however, is far from the truth. A 2002 White Paper claimed China has ruled
Xinjiang uninterrupted since the Han established an outpost 60 BC, but in fact no Chinese would rule the
area since the Tang Dynasty left in 755 until the Qing’s conquest in 1758.95 Xinjiang’s true status as
Chinese territory can be taken from its name which is translated to mean “New Territories” or “New
Frontier.” In relation to majority of Chinese territory, its status as being property of China is fairly
recent. The territory became incorporated into China following the Qing conquest by China’s longest
emperor, Qianlong. By consolidating Xinjiang, Qianlong was able to double China’s size, end the
Zunghar troubles (China’s western enemy), and create a firm western and northern border with Russia.96
Unlike today’s ruling regime, the Qing did not aim to incorporate Xinjiang into their state because of a
deeply held belief that Xinjiang always belonged to them, but were driven by simpler motives: security
and self-sufficiency.97 It was not conquered for “Sinicization” as some might speculate. Originally it was
not open to Chinese settlement or colonization and kept as a strategic frontier zone, and Xinjiang was
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allowed to keep their religious leaders, dietary practices and were not forced to shave their heads or
wear the Manchu queues.98
The Qing Dynasty’s early years were filled with expansion. From 1683 to 1760, Xinjiang, Taiwan,
the southwestern provinces, Mongolia, Kokonor and Tibet were all permanently acquired territories.99
They would face difficulty incorporating these acquisitions into their state, and the main hotspots of the
Qing conquest continue to be troubling for Chinese leaders today: Xinjiang, Tibet and Taiwan. Mao
Zedong, the creator of the current dynasty, proclaimed all territory held by the Qing at their maximal
extent to be PRC territory. During the period of century of humiliation where China was filled with
domestic upheavals (1850-1873) as Xinjiang would be the center of Muslim rebellions. Russia also
seized some of the fertile farmland in the Ili Valley. This territory would be returned in the 1881 Treaty
of St. Petersburg and in 1884 Xinjiang officially became a Chinese province. However, before the land
was returned to China, thousands of Uyghurs fled to Russia controlled territory fearing Qing rule.100
When the Qing Dynasty fell as a result of the 1911 Revolution, there was no immediate movement
towards creating an independent state as there was in Tibet or Mongolia. This was due to there being
no unified independence force, and a tremendous Chinese military presence in Xinjiang. Although there
is tremendous ethnic-tension in Xinjiang today, it still lacks a unified voice/movement. If strong
leadership can take advantage of this situation, China could be in trouble.
During the period of KMT rule, Uyghurs would establish two short-lived East Turkestan Republics
during the years of 1933-1934 and 1944-1945. This was influenced in part by Uyghur nationalism which
has begun to escalate since the turn of the century. The so-called “Uyghur Enlightenment” began when
wealthy Uyghur merchants and industrialists returned from Istanbul, Kazan and Europe and launched a
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modernized Uyghur education with nationalistic ideas.101 This period began the ethnic nationalism that
is currently in Xinjiang. Following the creation of People’s Republic of China, the PLA army was able to
easily consolidate its control over Xinjiang in 1950 with little resistance. At this time most Uyghurs felt
their fate was better sealed with living under Russian rule in a potential “Uyghuristan” or “Turkistan” like
the other Central Asian peoples, and many fled to Russian rule following the assertion of Chinese rule.102
The early years of PRC rule in Xinjiang showed great promise of allowing the Uyghurs to keep
their identity alive. This was a theme of Chinese policy towards minorities before the Great Leap
Forward. Tibet, like Xinjiang, would also remain untouched for the early Mao years. For both provinces
this changed with the launching of the Great Leap Forward (1958-1961) and intensified during the
Cultural Revolution (1966-1976). The days during the height of Maoism could be characterized with
oppressiveness towards Uyghurs that failed to live up to the initial promise of preserving Uyghur
identity. The Cultural Revolution was especially destructive because of the stated goal to destroy the
four olds: old customs, old culture, old habits, and old ideas. From the perspective of Han chauvinism or
communism, minority cultures contained all of these “olds” and thus were especially persecuted. In
Xinjiang, Mosques were used as centers to corral pigs, Muslim men were forced to shave their beards
and young Uyghur girls had their braids clipped.103 This height of Maoism left bitterness towards China
in Xinjiang.
The potential end date of the Cultural Revolution can be considered to be in 1969 when Mao
officially declared it to be over, in 1971 with the death of Lin Biao, or in 1976 with the death of Mao
Zedong. Regardless, the passing of Mao and removal of the Gang of Four brought in a more pragmatic,
less ideological leadership to Beijing. Deng Xiaoping would soon rise to power and he promoted Hu
Yaobang to powerful positions, bringing a more lenient policy throughout the 1980s towards Uyghurs.
101

Millward, 4
Millward, youtube “Uyghur-Han Relations since 1949: Professor James Millward.”
103
Millward, Youtube “Uyghur-Han Relations since 1949: Professor James Millward,”
102

Parrino 43
Hu desired to create a more tolerant environment in Xinjiang and encourage the promotion of ethnic
cadres within CCP leadership. However, the 1980s were also a time for complete disenchantment with
the Chinese state following the devastating Cultural Revolution. It would pave the way for the
outbreaks of violence in the 90s and 2000s.
During the 1980s Uyghurs became bitter over increasing Han migration into Xinjiang and nuclear
testing throughout the province. The area around Lop Nor is poisoned from 23 nuclear tests done
between 1964 to 1981 before China starting testing underground.104 Nuclear weapons and missile
testing continue in Xinjiang to this day. Han migration was official policy during the Cultural Revolution
in which many Han youths were “sent down” to the countryside to live on production and construction
farms. Many of those who were sent to Xinjiang were from Shanghai.105 Since the 1980s it has not been
official policy, but Han migration has been encouraged to assimilate Xinjiang into the PRC. However, the
Uyghurs do not seem to be integrating into the Chinese way of life, nor share a sense of Chinese
identity. They desire to be Uyghurs, not Chinese.
In 1979, with Deng Xiaoping at the helm China made a decision to open its economy and
integrate with the west. Deng’s policy focused on developing the Chinese economy by establishing four
special economic zones (Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Shantou and Xiamen) along the southeastern coast. In 1984
he would open up fourteen more coastal cities to foreign investment, and the south and eastern coasts
remain the economic power hub for the Chinese economy. This coastal development policy created the
demand or Xinjiang’s coal, oil, and gas reserves.106 Today Xinjiang remains one of the China’s largest
producers of fossil fuels, but Uyghurs complain that the economic benefits go to Han and not Uyghurs.
Hence there is a feeling of resentment amongst Uyghurs that Han Chinese are exploiting the regions
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resources. Xinjiang’s natural resources provide the economic motive for Chinese migration to the
region.
Since 1990 the ethnic tension in Xinjiang has been ever increasing. It is characterized by on and
off periods of ethnic violence by the Uyghurs, and the Chinese government’s suppression of separatist
activities. Xinjiang has also become more interesting to the western media because it features an
interesting blend of China, Islam, terrorism and human rights violations. It is difficult to get accurate
information on the uprisings and protests because of China’s lack of transparency and the biased
reporting by Uyghurs and Chinese alike. The first violent outburst against the Chinese state was the
Baren Uprising in April 1990. It involved logistics and planning, beginning on April 5 with rebels
besieging government houses in Baren, while another group burned a bus carrying policeman, killing the
policeman with knives and seized their guns and ammunition.107 The rebels had to seize guns because
they did not have the ability to purchase guns in Xinjiang (China has strict gun-control policies).
However, Chinese sources did claim Uyghurs were able to purchase some weapons.108 It seems that
towards the end of March there was a training camp to prepare rebels for the upcoming fight, and it
appears that they were forced to act quicker on the plot than they planned because their plot was about
to be discovered.109 The main issues that caused this uprising were the constant Han migration, and
rumors that Beijing would extend the one-child policy to minority populations (including the Uyghurs).110
Following the Baren uprising, several more terrorist attacks would occur, with the next major
attack being bus bombings in Urumqi on February 5, 1992. Three would be killed and twenty-three
injured. According to the 2002 PRC white paper Chinese forces discovered more bombs in a cinema and
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residential building that they defused.111 These attacks also showed signs of long-term organizational
planning.112 This caused the Chinese government to enhance their efforts in suppressing separatist
activities. According to Justin V. Hastings in 1993 there were 76 separatist incidents, with 191 people
arrested and 21 rebel cells uncovered. 1994 would be quieter with 30 separatist incidents.113 During
these years there would be moderately planned minor bombings and assassinations. On July 7, 1995
demonstrations would occur in Khotan in response to the arrests of local imams. To suppress the
protests tear gas was used and protestors were beaten. Official reports mention the injuries of 66
government officials, but fail to mention the injuries of the protestors.114
Since 1990 Beijing had become increasingly worried about the situation in Xinjiang, and on
March 19, 1996 a Politburo meeting discussed the problem. They came to the conclusion that illegal
religious activity and ethnic separatism were threating Xinjiang’s security, along with foreign influence
and infiltration. The following month China would launch a two-prong strategy to increase its hold over
Xinjiang: it initiated an intense “Strike Hard” campaign aimed at harshly suppressing the separatist
activities, and announced the official creation of the Shanghai Five Organization. The Shanghai Five was
a regional security organization between China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan committed
to combating the three evils of “separatism, extremism, and terrorism.” Uzbekistan would join in 2001,
causing the organization to be renamed the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). While the Strike
Hard Campaign aimed at combatting the illegal religious and ethnic separatist activity that threated the
Chinese state, the Shanghai Five was an attempt at improving Chinese relations with Central Asian states
neighboring Xinjiang to earn their favor and prevent them from influencing the Uyghurs.
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In tune with classic insurgency and counter-insurgency behavior, the Strike Hard campaign
caused an increase in insurgent behavior. The policy of crackdowns naturally created a new set of
grievances against the state. The period of 1996-1998 would be characterized as the most intense for
violent Uyghur behavior against the state. The immediate months after the launching of the Strike Hard
Campaign (April-June) would feature an immediate increase in logistically simple incidents such as
assassinations and protests.115 This was most likely the immediate reaction to the Chinese behavior
during the Strike Hard campaigns. Protests would breakout in retaliation to Chinese arrests of Uyghurs.
One such example was the February 1997 protests in Yining (Ghuljia), the “Ghuljia Incident,” in which
Uyghurs protests resulted from several factors, most notably the crackdown on Uyghur mashrups. From
February 5-8 a cycle of Uyghur demonstration and Chinese repression ensued: protestors were arrested;
tear gas, live ammunition, and dogs were reportedly used against Uyghurs; Uyghurs rioted torching
vehicles and attacking Chinese police or Han residents; and the rioters carried banners and slogans
calling for Uyghur equality and independence.116 The number of deaths and arrests are unknown, but
the death total from this incident has been estimated around 10 people and thousands of individuals
were arrested. Some that were deemed responsible were executed, a theme in China’s crackdown on
Uyghur unrest. According to Amnesty International cases have been documented of detainees receiving
frostbite after being hosed down in an open stadium.117 Soon after the Ghuljia Incident, bus bombings
tied to Uyghur separatism occurred in February and March of 1997: on February 27, 1997 bombs
exploded on three buses in the capital city of Urumqi, coinciding with the memorial ceremonies for
Deng Xiaoping. This event killed nine and wounded sixty-eight. On March 7 a bus in Beijing exploded
that some attributed to Uyghur separatism, but this is highly speculative.118
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By mid-1998 violent actions undertaken by Uyghurs against China had died down and the Strike
Hard campaign could be considered successful. For the most part terrorist attacks would die down until
July 2009. This does not mean that during this time ethnic tension waned in Xinjiang. According to
James Millward even though there were no outbursts of violence, the interethnic relations between Han
and Uyghurs were tenser than they were during the height of violence in 1997-1998.119 In fact they
were more resentful than ever. At the same time the imminent terrorist threat to the Chinese state was
exaggerated by China. This may be due to the fact that from Beijing’s perspective it works well for statenationalism to exaggerate the threat of ethnic separatism to the people. In August 2008 there were two
violent incidents against Chinese soldiers that seemed to take little logistical planning.120 On August 4,
two Uyghurs stole a truck crashed into a group of soldiers; then threw homemade explosives and
stabbed the victims. Sixteen would be killed and sixteen wounded. Six days later several Uyghurs stole
taxis and used them to throw homemade explosives at symbols of Chinese repression, and economic
exploitation: police cars, the Public Security Bureau, the industry and commerce building and several
other buildings. Several police officers would die. In July 2009 ethnic violence would again outbreak as
riots occurred between Uyghurs and Han stemming from anger over accusations of Uyghur men raping a
Han woman at a factory in Shaoguan, Guangdong. The riots would last from July 5 – July 8, 2009
culminating in an official death toll of 197, making it the source of the most serious unrest in Xinjiang to
date. Again this featured violence that occurred without any logistical planning, but Xinjiang featured
tremendous interethnic tension that the slightest event could spark mass violence.
China blamed external sources for instigating the July 2009 violence. Whether it is true or not,
the Chinese government constantly blames foreigners for instigating domestic violence within its
territory, rather than admit its own suppression policies may be the cause of unrest. This is in part due
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to the memory of the century of humiliation and constant insecurity Chinese leaders have of foreigners
meddling in their internal affairs. The century of humiliation featured a constant interference in Chinese
affairs by the imperial powers, and since 1949 China is vigilant of external factors causing internal
disturbances. China has tried to portray Rebiya Kadeer, the President of the World Uyghur Congress
(international organization representing the interests of the Uyghur people worldwide), in a similar light
to the Dalai Lama as an enemy of the state trying to separate territory from China. However, she
commands far less influence over the Uyghur people than the Dalai Lama does for Tibetans.
Nonetheless the Chinese government accused her of planning the 2009 riots by spreading information
about the Shaoguan incident through the internet and cell phones and encouraging violence. Much like
the Arab Spring, China believed that technology aided the separatist efforts of the Uyghur people. China
has always been concerned that technology could aid dissidents in arousing agitation against the
Chinese state, thus it attempts to control the flow of information to the best of its ability. Reporting on
sensitive topics such as Xinjiang, Tibet and Taiwan are closely monitored. According to web experts
China is able to swiftly censor web information by temporarily closing unwanted websites for “technical
maintenance.”121 They did this soon after the Urumqi riots in July 2009 and will continue to do so in the
future.
In recent years, the conflict between Uyghur separatists and the Chinese state has expanded to
outside Xinjiang. On October 28, 2013, Uyghurs orchestrated a vehicular attack on Tiananmen Square
that left two dead and over 40 injured that Beijing attributed to Uyghur separatism. Beijing immediately
reacted to the vehicular attack by arresting five suspects related to the crime. One of the suspects,
Yusup Umarniyaz, was from a predominately Uyghur town in Xinjiang that last June was the site of
violence that left 27 people dead, including 10 police officers.122 In response to the Tiananmen attack,
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the PLA stepped up its efforts in Xinjiang. However this did not slow down attacks, and on November
16, 2013 nine men armed with axes stormed a police station near the southwestern Xinjiang town of
Selibuya.123 The government stated that all nine assailants died along with two people who assisted in
the attack.124 Most recently on March 1, 2014 Uyghur separatists launched a knife-wielding attack at a
railway station in the Chinese city of Kunming, Yunnan, which left 29 civilians dead. One witness said
“everyone ran. There were knives everywhere and they began throwing at people.”125 All three attacks
involve very simple weapons, the likely result of the difficulty to smuggle weapons into Xinjiang. Some
experts are saying that Uyghurs are attacking places outside Xinjiang because attacks within the region
have little political impact and China proper has more lenient security.126
China has also been able to take advantage of the post 9/11 world. In October 2001, a month
after 9/11, China claimed that there were several Uyghur terrorist movements within Xinjiang, thereby
presenting its internal struggle against separatism as China also becoming a victim to global terrorism.127
Beijing was also able to have the US place the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) on its list of
terrorist organizations. Beijing remains very worried that the global Islamic jihadi movement will enter
into Xinjiang. It fears influence, ideas, people and weapons being transported into Xinjiang from any of
the countries bordering it: Afghanistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Mongolia, Pakistan, Russia and
Tajikistan. China is especially worried about the borders that it shares with Central Asian Islamic
countries that either have current jihad movements, or share sympathy to the Uyghur cause. However,
luckily for China the roughly 6,000 km of borders Xinjiang shares with the world are mountainous terrain
that makes cross-border travel difficult. The terrain is so difficult that only a few highways connect
Xinjiang with the world, and many of these passes are only open seasonally. There are six legal year
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round border crossings: two in Kyrgyzstan and four in Kazakhstan. There are nine seasonal border
crossings: three in Kazakhstan, four in Mongolia, one in Pakistan, and one in Tajikistan. Kazakhstan is
the only Central Asian border with flat terrain thus, is the source for much of the trade that enters
Xinjiang.128 This border also contains China’s oil pipeline that connects it to Central Asia and is the
source of the only railway connection between Xinjiang and Central Asia. Kyrgyzstan, though
mountainous, does have two mountain passes that act as the only year-round legal connections Xinjiang
has to the world besides Kazakhstan. Pakistan’s Karakorum Highway is only open temporarily as it is
closed much of the year due to snow. It is after all the highest international paved highway in the world.
Tajikistan’s seasonal border crossing legally opened in June 2004 following the construction of a road at
Kulma Pass, but it is only open half the year. Finally, the four seasonal border crossings with Mongolia
are not as important for the security situation in Xinjiang because the bulk of the Uyghur population
lives in the western and southern portions of Xinjiang.129
China’s border with Central Asian states is a relatively new phenomenon. Following the collapse
of the USSR n 1991, China quickly established border relations with the newly independent states of
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. The USSR collapse presented China with an opportunity to regain
34,000 square kilometers it had claimed in Central Asia because these newly independent states could
not defend themselves against China’s stronger military force. Instead, China sought to cooperate with
these new states over territorial disputes in return for assistance on China’s security situation in
Xinjiang.130 China sought to seek friendship with these three Central Asian states bordering Xinjiang
because it believed that contesting disputed territory would harm its territorial integrity and undermine
the security effort in Xinjiang.
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With the USSR collapse, China and Kazakhstan inherited a 1,056 mile (1,700 km) border of which
365 square miles (944 square kilometers) were in dispute.131 China immediately sought to end this
border dispute through settlement and diplomatic means. This culminated in a 1998 Sino-Kazakh accord
with China gaining just over 43% of the disputed land and Kazakhstan retaining just under 57% of the
land.132 China’s border dispute with Kyrgyzstan would be settled in 1999 with Kyrgyzstan ceding almost
480 square miles (1,240 sq. km) to China.133 China and Tajikistan began settling the disputed territory
along their 250 mile (400 km) border through negotiations in 1999 that the Tajikistan legislature finally
ratified in January 2011.134 In dispute was 10,811 square miles (28,000 sq. km) of which Tajikistan in
1999 agreed to cede 77 square miles (200 sq. km) which was then increased to 433 square miles (1,122
sq. km) in a 2002 agreement.135 Like China’s agreement with Kazakhstan, China lost more land than it
gained.
China’s territorial concessions of disputed territory to the Central Asian states are important in
understanding their strategy for maintaining the territorial integrity of Xinjiang. It showed that Beijing
believes in order to secure Xinjiang, friendship and cooperation with Central Asia is imperative. Friendly
border relations help control the smuggling of weapons and prevent these states from aiding the Uyghur
cause. The territorial concessions are also important to understand the Chinese holistic strategy
towards territorial integrity. It showed that despite the century of humiliation that has haunted the
Chinese perception of maintain territorial integrity, China was willing to negotiate on contested
territory. This may offer a glimpse of hope for the peaceful resolution of the current island disputes in
the South and East China Sea. However, these are two completely different scenarios in that the former
contested land with Central Asia was of little strategic, symbolic or economic value to Beijing, and the
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Central Asian states were weaker than China. The Central Asian states had no goal of keeping China
weak.
China secured cooperation with its new neighbors through the creation of the Shanghai Five in
1996. It is by no means an accident that its creation coincided with the launching of the 1996 Strike
Hard campaign. China’s interest in suppressing perceived anti-Chinese separatist movements and its
relation with Central Asia are two sides of the same coin. As mentioned earlier the organization would
expand in 2001 to include Uzbekistan, which does not border Xinjiang, and thus was not included in the
original five. This increased the organization to six total members and the name was changed to the
Shanghai Cooperation Organization. The SCO is effectively a Chinese led organization designed to
combat the three evils of “separatism, extremism, and terrorism” that undermine its territorial integrity
in Xinjiang. Today the SCO also includes five “observer states” (India, Pakistan, Iran, Afghanistan and
Mongolia), two “dialogue partners” (Belarus and Sri Lanka) and two “guests” (AESEAN and
Commonwealth of Independent States). Obviously the SCO’s significance has grown beyond simply
being an organization interested in managing cross-border ethnic movements. It is currently a
multilateral security organization in which its members reflect a shared value of stability, and share the
common fears/concerns of Islamic militancy, U.S. hegemony/dominance, reduced U.S. military presence
in the region (it condones US use of Central Asian bases for the war effort in Afghanistan but seek
deadlines of ultimate withdrawal to prevent permanent bases) and color revolutions.136 Still, China’s
main motive for creating the organization stemmed from maintaining its hold over Xinjiang and it
remains Beijing’s primary focus within the SCO.
In 2004 the Regional Anti-Terrorism Structure (RATS) of the SCO officially opened in Tashkent,
Uzbekistan, where it functions as a permanent organ for all member states to share intelligence and
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work together to combat the three evils. RATS and the SCO are mainly financed by the three wealthiest
members: Kazakhstan, Russia and China. China sees Kazakhstan as especially important in its efforts to
consolidate Xinjiang because the greatest concentration of Uyghurs outside Xinjiang lives in Kazakhstan,
with a population of roughly 400,000 Uyghurs.137 Also as mentioned earlier, Kazakhstan is the main
transport for cross border trade into Xinjiang because it is the only flat terrain that surrounds Xinjiang.
Uyghur rebels looking to smuggle weapons and themselves usually cross this terrain. Uyghurs need to
smuggle weapons into China because guns are not readily available due to China’s strict gun control. As
a result smugglers are left with two options of transport into China: going around the legal checkpoints,
or attempting to sneak weapons past legal checkpoints. It is difficult to go outside the legal checkpoints
because the treacherous terrain is extremely difficult to cross, raising the time and money it takes to
transport weapons. It may be impossible to have a support structure capable of accomplishing this.138
Most are forced to sneak the weapons in through legal checkpoints. Fortunately for China, the
smugglers are limited in how many weapons they can transport at a time for fear of being discovered.139
Thus the Uyghur separatist attempt is clearly limited in its ability to bring weapons into Xinjiang, limiting
the ability of the Uyghurs to mount a sophisticated separatist campaign.
The Uyghur separatist attempt also seems to suffer from a lack of unity. While there is a great
deal of ethnic tension, it is not a unified violent force. Beijing’s greatest fear will be if a Uyghur leader
can unite the Uyghur tension against the Chinese state. The ethnic divide is evident, and the situation in
Xinjiang could be characterized as a volcano waiting to explode. Chinese domestic upheaval during the
century of humiliation illustrates how much more effective a domestic movement will be if the
campaign is well organized under strong leadership. Rebiya Kadeer is not a strong enough leader today
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because she does not hold a great deal of influence over the Uyghurs in Xinjiang. While much of the
country featured domestic rebellions from 1850-1873, the Taiping rebellion was the most
destructive/successful because it was well organized under Hong Xiuquan and bonded by a common
ideology. According to James Millward Uyghur, resistance to Beijing rule since the 19th century has been
common, discontinuous and bonded by different ideologies.140 Although many would like to
characterize Islam as the binding force that unites Uyghurs against Chinese rule, it is one of the many
that has bonded Uyghurs throughout time. The practice of Islam is, however, a symbol against the
Chinese civic identity and makes Uyghurs different from Chinese.
Today Xinjiang is ripe with tension. As of 2007, Xinjiang was home to roughly 20 million people,
with the Uyghur population at 9.6 million, and the Han at 8.2 million.141 The rest is home to various
minorities, most notably the Kazak at around 1 million people. This is a tremendous disparity to the
Xinjiang of 1949 which featured a population of roughly 3 million people, dominated by a Uyghur
presence. The Han influx is due to the creation of the 1954 Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps
(a quasi-military, quasi-business group dominated by the Han), the establishment of prison labor camps
whose inmates stayed after being released from custody, the Han who were “sent down” during
Cultural Revolution, and the current Chinese effort to bring development to Xinjiang.142 It seems that
the development strategy to assimilate Xinjiang into China is not working, but actually fostering more
resentment. It appears that the Han are the ones that make money, not the Uyghurs, and this fuels an
antagonistic nationalism over the perceived exploitation of Uyghur resources by the Chinese. China has
initiated affirmative action programs to help bring wealth to Uyghurs, but it still struggles to overcome
the perception that the economy in Xinjiang is run by the Han. The Han migration also makes the
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Uyghurs fear they are losing their way of life, and their identity. In fact some cities in Xinjiang have
started to resemble the cities of Eastern China.143 The city designs look very Chinese.
In practice contemporary Xinjiang is an ethnically segregated province. There is very little
intermarriage or social activity among the groups. Worse, the Han moving into Xinjiang today are less
concerned about knowing or understanding Uyghur culture or identity than past migrants.144 It is
different from other parts of Central Asia during the Soviet Union where different ethnicities
intermarried with the Russians. According to James Millward, the people of Xinjiang would be surprised
to see the Central Asian ability to coincide, and Central Asia would be surprised by the segregation of
the Xinjiang region.145 Most Uyghurs even run on a different time. China operates under one time zone,
commonly referred to as Beijing Time or China Standard Time (UTC +08:00) despite the fact that China
geographically covers several different time zones. This is part of China’s grand design of unity. Most of
Xinjiang unofficially operates in practice under “Urumqi Time” which is two hours behind Beijing. Han
Chinese generally uses Beijing time, while Uyghurs generally use Urumqi Time.
In conclusion, China is struggling to consolidate Xinjiang into its territory. Through a
combination of carrots and sticks China is trying to assimilate the Uyghurs into the Chinese state. This is
met mostly with resistance because Uyghurs wish to maintain their Uyghur identity, and currently fear
that the Han Chinese will destroy their way of life. In many ways China is, not because China hates the
Uyghur way of life but that it is antagonistic to the state attempt to unify its peoples. Since Xinjiang is
legally Chinese territory, Beijing is trying to influence Uyghurs and incorporate them into the Chinese
way of life. Uyghur identity is repressed because it is seen as separatist towards Beijing’s goals. The
unity of the Chinese state and state nationalism directly coincides with Han nationalism and Han way of
life. In Xinjiang, Uyghur and other local languages have been phased out of instruction to become
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second languages in they were taught at all. This is important because Chinese identity is strongly
synonymous with the written Chinese language.
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Tibet:

146

China’s territorial claim to Tibet has drawn much criticism from around the world. After their
claim to Taiwan, Tibet is the most popular depiction of an over-aggressive Chinese state. However, from
China’s viewpoint, there is nothing aggressive or domineering about their sovereignty over Tibetan land.
Like Xinjiang, Beijing maintains that Tibet has been historically part of China. The Tibet Autonomous
Region of China (TAR) contains roughly 471,000 square miles of land on China’s southwestern frontier
bordering India, Nepal, and Bhutan. Roughly 92% of the TAR’s 3 million people are ethnic Tibetan,
leaving Tibet with a much different demographic scene when compared to Xinjiang. However, the
Tibetan nation is not limited to just the TAR, and is roughly twice the size of the TAR extending into
ethnic Tibetan areas in four other Chinese provinces: Gansu, Yunnan, Sichuan and Qinghai.147 Currently
there is tension between Tibetan nationalism and Chinese state-nationalism; along with the Tibetan call
for independence, and PRC effort to assimilate Tibet into China.
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The complex historical relationship between China and Tibet is based upon the fact that Tibet
has long been subordinate to Chinese rule, but has usually operated independently. China’s territorial
claim to Tibet originates from the Yuan Dynasty (1271-1368) when both China and Tibet were ruled by
the Mongols. Genghis Khan began the conquest of China by attacking the Jurchen’s in Manchuria who
had killed his father, and his grandson Kublai Khan completed it. Genghis Khan, and the Mongol Khans
who succeeded him, acquired much of Asia through conquests and ruled through the appointments of
military governors to maintain the peace. Tibet was an exception to this rule and allowed to be ruled
internally by the Buddhists of the Sakya Sect and was not subject to military garrisons.148 The period of
Mongol rule brought to Tibet the so-called “priest-patron” relationship between Tibet and China where
the Sakya sect ruled Tibet. Many contemporary Tibetans like to believe the rule was limited to this
“cho-yon” (“priest-patron”) relationship as seen by Kublai Khan’s appointment of Pagma to handle
Buddhist affairs across the country.149 The rule was not limited to the priest-patron relationship and
Tibet was subject to Mongol political and military rule as witnessed by Mongol troops being ordered into
Tibet to stabilize it.150 However, the relationship is not as politically subordinate as Chinese historians
and scholars depict it.151
In 1368 the Ming Dynasty would overthrow the Yuan Dynasty and found their capital at Nanjing.
This would be the first ethnic Han-Chinese dynasty to rule over a unified China since the fall of the Tang
Dynasty. The Ming was also more interested in domestic politics than maintaining an empire beyond
China.152 Tibet’s relationship with China during the Ming Dynasty is also interpreted differently by
Tibetans and Chinese. Like the Yuan Dynasty, the official history of the Ming Dynasty places Tibet
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outside of the geography of Ming China.153 The Ming would inherit the Yuan’s relationship with Tibet,
but kept this relationship superficial because they lacked the will or need to impose the level of
dependency Tibet placed on the Yuan.154 The early Ming was mostly interested in Tibet because of their
relationship with the Mongols who were the greatest security threat to the Ming. Tibetans and
Mongolians shared the Tibetan Buddhist religion (from Yuan dynasty) that translated into a friendly
alliance. Once the Mongol threat passed, the Ming lost interest in Tibet and did little to enforce their
claim over Tibet.155 The Ming would impose titles on Buddhist lamas but even this seemed to be merely
superficial. This is often used by Chinese sources to provide evidence for China’s historical sovereignty
over Tibetan affairs. However, according to Warren W. Smith Jr, “Despite later Chinese claims, Ming
patronage of Tibetan lamas and their award of meaningless titles and non-existent officials positions can
hardly be said to be the equivalent of actual Ming authority over Tibet or evidence that Tibet was a ‘part
of China’ during the Ming.”156 Moreover it is likely that the Ming’s patronage of Tibetan lamas were
more intended to stabilize border regions and protect trade routes than to impose political and military
control on Tibet.157
The Mongol threat to Chinese security is a recurring theme throughout Chinese history. This
threat would continue while the Manchurian Qing Dynasty ruled China from 1644-1911. Again the
relationship with lamas would be important because they served as spiritual inspirations to the warlike
Mongols who practiced Tibetan Buddhism. Emperor Kangxi (ruled 1662-1722) would ask the Dalai Lama
on several occasions to calm down Mongolian princes or act as a mediator in between them.158 Tibet
would also recognize Chinese suzerainty over Tibet, which PRC scholars argue that this is indication of
Tibet’s political submission to the Chinese emperor but most scholars outside the PRC contend that this
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relationship was mostly ceremonial.159 The Qing influence in Tibet would be the strongest of China’s
dynasties, and would lay the foundation for the PRC’s interest in Tibet.
When the Mongolian threat died down after tribes submitted to the Qing, Tibet lost its strategic
diplomatic importance and became merely one of China’s frontier borderlands.160 This historical shift in
Tibetan-Chinese relations is usually dated to 1720. At this time Emperor Kangxi ordered Manchu troops
into Tibetan territory to expel the Zunghar Mongols (leaders of a major inner Asia steppe empire) who
invaded Tibet, and escort the Seventh Dalai Lama into Lhasa. They entered Tibet as liberators from the
Zunghar Mongols and the supporters of the Seventh Dalai Lama.161 The early eighteenth century had
been marked by political upheaval in Tibet since the death of the fifth Dalai Lama. The sixth Dalai Lama
appeared to have been a poor spiritual leader (although a great poet) and refused to take the vows to
be a monk. The Zunghars had invaded in 1717 and although they were able to control Lhasa they were
left without the legitimacy to rule that the title of Dalai Lama.162 The effective expulsion of the Zunghars
from Tibet marked the beginning of the Qing’s domination in the region. In 1721 Tibet would reorganize
the Tibetan government under the guidance of the Qing military, with an amban to conduct Tibetan
foreign relations directly under Qing supervision.163
The Qing would again constantly intervene in Tibet, most notably in 1786 when the Nepalese
Kingdom of Ghurka invaded. This would be the fourth time in less than a century that the Qing had
intervened in Tibet.164 After that, Tibet would become part of the Great Game between competing
imperial powers Russia and Great Britain while the Qing slowly watched its influence decline in Tibet.
The decline of China’s influence throughout the 19th century directly resulted from the diminishing Qing
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power. Great Britain did acknowledge that the Qing government had the right to make treaties for
Tibet in part because so little information was known about Tibet that Britain assumed China ruled it
directly.165 Eventually British influence would enter Tibet following the 1876 Chefoo Convention which
granted Britain the right to an exploratory mission under Colonel Macauley. Tibet became more worried
about British influence than they were of other foreign powers. By 1899 Lord Curzon would become the
viceroy of India and he desperately sought to seek out trading privileges in Tibet. This led to the British
invasion of Tibet in 1904 under the command of Colonel Francis Younghusband, which culminated in the
1904 Lhasa Convention with the British being granted their trading privileges. This ended Tibet’s period
of international isolation, exposed the myth of Chinese authority over Tibet, and gave the Tibetans an
exposure to the outside world.166 However, following the fall of the Qing during the 1911 revolution,
Tibet began to perceive Great Britain as capable of guaranteeing their independence.
Following the collapse of the Qing, Tibet proclaimed itself to be an independent state. They
expelled all Chinese officials and troops from the region in 1913, allowing Tibet to function
independently for the first time since the Qing arrived in 1720. Great Britain would function as a
protector of Tibetan independence. In 1914 the Simla Agreement demarcated the McMahon Line as the
boundary separating India and Tibet. Tibetans site this as an indication of Tibetan autonomy from
China. The Chinese position is that Tibetan representatives did not have the legal standing to sign such a
document because China exercised control over Tibet’s external relations.167 The Chinese state was in
feeble condition in 1914, and the representatives at the conference initialed but did not sign the
agreement. The thirteenth Dalai Lama would also re-enter Tibet, following his flight to India after the
British invaded, and function as a leader of the Tibetan people. No Chinese official would return until
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the Thirteenth Dalai Lama died in 1933.168 He strengthened the Tibetan army to deter invasion, being
fearful that China would invade and the “red ideology” would destroy his precious Buddhism as it did in
Mongolia.169
After World War II Great Britain abandoned its empire in India, thus losing interest in ensuring
Tibetan security. Great Britain believed that the responsibility to protect Tibetan independence would
become India’s. Unfortunate for Tibetans, Prime Minister Nehru was convinced by Mao Zedong that the
Chinese would settle the Tibetan question peacefully. They did not, and invaded Tibet on October 7,
1950, the same day UN Forces under General MacArthur crossed the 38th Parallel into North Korea.
Mao believed it to be strategically important for China to rule Tibet, and not foreign powers. Any simple
look at a map will illustrate the geopolitical importance of Tibet. The Tibetan Plateau was in fact China’s
“soft underbelly” bordering the provinces of Xinjiang, Qinghai, Sichuan and Yunnan.170 Due to the focus
on the Korean War, along with the vacuum of British protection in Tibet, Tibet was left without
international help. El Salvador requested the UN General Assembly place Mao’s invasion on the agenda
at the United Nations, but solving the Tibet Question was postponed to focus on Korea.171 Despite the
Thirteenth Dalai Lama’s strengthening of Tibetan forces, they were no match for the PLA and sent a
delegation to Beijing on April 2, 1951, reaching an agreement on May 23 of that same year. Here
delegated signed the infamous “Seventeen-point Agreement,” stating Chinese sovereignty over Tibet,
with Tibet enjoying some autonomy. The agreement “committed Beijing to allow religious freedom,
recognized the role of the Dalai Lama, promised that the central authorities would not alter the political
system and gave Beijing control of the territory’s external relations.”172 Over time the Seventeen-point
Agreement would become little more than a piece of paper. Today, religious practice is closely
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scrutinized, the Dalai Lama is exiled in India, and the political system in Tibet has totally changed.
Mao Zedong originally intended to enact a “Go Slow” policy in Tibet. Although he hated Tibet’s
feudalistic society he realized that the shift towards socialism would have to be a gradual one. Mao
wanted to earn the favor of Tibetan elites first and maintain the existing political structure to secure the
PRC’s territorial claim. Mongolia and Xinjiang were quickly integrated as Autonomous Regions but
Beijing recognized that they needed to adopt a more cautious position to gradually gain the confidence
of Tibetans.173 Thus the Preparatory Committee for the eventual establishment of the Autonomous
Region of Tibet (PCART) was established as a transition to the eventual establishment of Tibet as an
Autonomous Region. The Dalai Lama was appointed Chairman of the PCART, with PLA General Zhang
Guohua as the Deputy Chairman, whom in practice ran the PCART affairs.174 This all changed following
the 1959 Tibetan rebellion. The unrest that caused the rebellion began in 1952 in the Kham and Amdo
Tibetan regions that lay outside the TAR. These regions were exempt from the “go slow” policy and
were experiencing the changes of communist governance that affected their Tibetan identity. These
areas began witnessing democratic reforms in 1956, and by September 95% of the Tibetan areas in
Sichuan had completed the reforms.175 Reform often consisted of “liberating” the Tibetan people who
were perceived to be serfs victimized by feudalism. The TAR was not experiencing these political
changes. An example of this 1956 unrest includes the Kanding revolt which broke out in Sichuan after
the PLA sieged a Buddhist monastery. Fighting consisted of 10,000 Khampas fighting for several months
before it was eventually suppressed.176
In 1959 the rebellion spread into Lhasa. These rebellions were nationalistic in nature, but
received a great deal of external support by the CIA. This has left a lasting impression in Beijing of

173

Shakya, 124
Shakya, 129
175
Smith, 406
176
Fravel, 75
174

Parrino 64
foreigners meddling in their affairs to keep China weak, already haunted by the memory of the century
of humiliation. The CIA assistance in Tibet was part of the Cold War policy to contain communism
worldwide. The CIA trained Khampas in Colorado for insertion into Tibet under the operation ST Circus,
and spending millions of dollars on weapons for Tibetan guerillas. The weapons airdropped into Tibet
far exceed the current weapons being smuggled from Central Asia into Xinjiang. The CIA even paid
$180,000 directly to the Dali Lama.177 In the midst of the rebellion the fourteenth Dalia Lama retreated
to India (after rumors of a plot to kill him surfaced) where he remains today. Also, Premier Zhou Enlai
announced that China no longer felt bound to the Seventeen-point Agreement , proclaimed it invalid,
and China thus set out to truly transition Buddhist, Tibet into a Chinese Communist state.178
The suppression of the 1959 rebellion caused an increase in Tibetan nationalism. Tibetan
nationalism is a relatively new phenomenon that like mainland China developed during the late 19th
century. It was not aroused during the period of Qing intervention in Tibet. According to Warren W.
Smith, “Ch’ing [Qing] domination of Tibet had only a small effect on the Tibetan sense of national
identity and it did little to arouse Tibetan nationalism. However, when the Ch’ing protectorate over
Tibet was later interpreted by the Chinese as the equivalent of Chinese sovereignty over Tibet, Tibetan
nationalism was around in response.”179 This remains consistent with the findings in Xinjiang, where
nationalism seemed to arise in response to PRC policies. The difference here, however, is that Tibet
functioned as a de facto independent state from the fall of the Qing to the PRC conquest in 1950-1951.
Maoist policies would further increase this drive towards local, ethnic nationalism. It appears that
China’s policy to create a unified state with the inclusion of these ethnic frontiers has been the driving
force of this nationalism. It is paradoxical because ethnic nationalism is a response to Chinese state led
nationalism, and Chinese state led nationalism is an attempt to create a strong unified state that will
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enable China to reclaim their presence as the dominant power in East Asia. Ethnic nationalism today is a
threat to China’s territorial integrity.
The suppression of the 1959 rebellion resulted in the fleeing of roughly between 50-70,000 of
Tibetans between 1959-1965 to India, Nepal and Bhutan.180 Most Tibetans left after China’s antirebellion campaign.181 The anti-rebellion campaign actually did more to damage Chinese-Tibetan
relations than the actual uprising, and it was often the first contact most Tibetans had with Chinese.182
The campaign was intended to receive cooperation for Chinese rule and get Tibetans involved with
political life. Often those who were involved in the revolt were accused of “betraying the motherland.”
Tsering Shakya summarizes the perceptions regarding betrayal beautifully:
What the Chinese saw as the most traitorous crime, ‘betraying the Motherland’, was an
empty slogan to the majority of Tibetans who had never looked towards China as a
‘Motherland’ and to whom the Chinese were foreigners as much as the British or the
Indians, with an ideology as alien as Christianity. To the Tibetans the revolt was never
seen as betrayal.183
Land reform would be introduced to overthrow the feudal system of Tibet and its inequalities.
However Mao still believed he needed aristocratic power, so the ones that did not aid in the rebellion
did not originally have their land taken from them. While this land reform did change the Tibetan way
of life, by many respects the Tibetan system was backwards and in need of reform. So some peasants
welcomed the Maoist reform the aimed at equality and wealth distribution. The Dalai Lama himself was
attracted to the economic and social ideals of Marxism.184 However by 1961, the last year of the postGreat Leap Forward famine, Tibetans could not ignore that Chinese communist rule in Tibet had failed to
produce a socialist paradise but suffering as food production would be confiscated to feed the
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Chinese.185 Many would also be imprisoned without justifiable cause. The Tibetan Government in exile
estimated 173,000 deaths in prisons and labor camps, while the Panchen Lama estimated that 10-15%
of the Tibetan population had been imprisoned (he said 5% in his 70,000 character petition to Chairman
Mao because he claims he did not have the courage to state such a high figure).186 As a result of the
70,000 character petition he would be purged in 1964, causing him to be imprisoned and tortured for
some time. The following year Tibet officially became an autonomous region. However, the worst was
yet to come for Tibetans.
The Cultural Revolution (roughly 1966-1976) turned into a total attack on Tibetan culture. It was
an attack on traditional Chinese culture and Tibet was not exempt from this assault. The attack on Tibet
was even worse than it was in Xinjiang. The Cultural Revolution in Tibet would be officially launched on
August 25, 1966 when Tibetan and Chinese Red Guards attacked Tsuglhakhang (or Jokhang), Lhasa’s
Central Cathedral. Some relics were removed before the attack on the Panchen Lama’s orders, while all
frescoes and scriptures were destroyed in the attack.187 On August 27, Red Guards would distribute this
four-page pamphlet designed to influence Tibetans to give up their old feudal way of life, and move
towards a socialist society:
(1) Bowing and sticking tongue out as a sign of respect should be abolished, as these are
the signs of feudal oppression of the proletariat.
(2) All observance of religious festivals should be abolished.
(3) All feudal names of parks and streets should be changed (for example the Norbu
Linga [Norbulingka] should be named the Peoples’ Park).
(4) All large and small chotens must be destroyed.
(5) All books praising the idealism and feudalism should be prohibited.
(6) All mani walls, prayers flags and incense burners should be destroyed.
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(7) No one should recite prayers, circumambulate, prostrate. People should not consult
oracles and diviners.
(8) People should destroy all photographs of the Dalai and the Panchen.
(9) All photo praising revisionists, feudalism or reactionaries should be destroyed.
(10) All monasteries and temples apart from those that are protected by the
government should be converted for general public use.
(11)The Tibet Daily and Lhasa radio must use the language of the proletariat and
expunge the language of aristocracy. Accordingly, Tibetan grammar should be
reformed.
(12) All Muslims should also embrace the new society and destroy the old traditions.
(13) The People’s Park, formerly the Norbu Linga, should be opened to the public for
recreation.
(14) There should be greater political and ideological education among the monks and
nuns. They should be allowed to abandon their religious duties and vows without
pressure from the monasteries.
(15) Monks and nuns should be allowed to marry and they must engage in productive
labor.
(16) The exploiting class should be subjected to labor education and a close watch
should be kept on their conduct.
(17) Feudal practices, such as giving parties, exchanging presents and kha-ta should be
stopped.
(18) Feudal marriage practices, such as one man having two wives, one woman having
two husbands, father and son sharing a wife, two sisters sharing one husband and two
brothers sharing a wife should be eradicated.
(19) Scientific education should be propagated among the people. Films which teach
scientific education should be shown.
(20) All stray dogs in Lhasa must be destroyed and people should not keep dogs and cats
in the house.188
This Red Guard pamphlet summarizes the Chinese perspective on what needed to be
accomplished in Tibet during the Cultural Revolution: abruptly transition Tibet from a backwards feudal
society into a communist state, socially educate the people to believe the communist ideology, and
destroy the Buddhist religion. From the Tibetan perspective the Cultural Revolution was designed to
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destroy the Tibetan way of life, and this further increased the nationalistic sentiment. 40,000 portraits
of Mao Zedong would be distributed throughout Lhasa demonstrating the supremacy of Mao over the
Dalai Lama, Tibetan streets were renamed in favor of national Chinese names, and the PRC state flag
would replace the Buddhist prayer flags.189 Also included in this changing face of identity were the
Tibetan marriage practices: allowing monks to marry and the practices of fraternal polyandry and
polygamy. Fraternal polyandry still exists to some degree today, and derived from the idea of keeping
property within the same family unit.
Especially targeted for destruction during the Cultural Revolution was Tibetan Buddhism. The
systematic attack on Buddhism during this time was horrific. It would also announce the greatest
dissatisfaction towards Chinese rule because for Tibetans this was the greatest source of Tibetan
identity. Tibetan Buddhism continues to be at the center of Tibetan identity, and nationalism today.
During the Cultural Revolution roughly 6,000 monasteries were destroyed, and the remnants of this
destruction are still visible.190 Due to the ideology of the Cultural Revolution to be utopian and antireligion, it seemed that everything associated with the Buddhist religion was dismantled to be practically
used by the Communists. Buddhist scriptures were burnt and converted into toilet paper or shoe lining,
timber and stones from monasteries and temples would become the building blocks for Chinese offices,
housing and PLA barracks; religious mani stones became walkways so that Tibetans could desecrate
their own religion as they walked, or used to construct public toilets; private religious shrines were
destroyed while all religious objects that held monetary value would be shipped back to mainland
China.191
The 1969 Nyemo Revolt would take place in the midst of the Cultural Revolution. Although
Tibetans and Chinese both use this revolt to indicate separatist/independence implications, its motives
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were more so a reaction to the chaotic Cultural Revolution than a search for Tibetan nationalist identity
free from Chinese rule. Regardless it is the “second Tibetan revolt” and deserves to be mentioned here
for its contribution to nationalism, and especially its resentment to Chinese rule. It was led by a nun,
Thrinley Choedron, and she and her supporters targeted “enemies of the faith”: Chinese Cadres and
Tibetans who supported them. In some ways this crazy, frenzy attack sounds similar to the Boxer
Rebellion when Boxers attacked foreigners and Chinese Christian converts. During the outbreak she
attacked the Communist headquarters in Nyemo, slaughtered many who worked there, and chopped off
the hands of Tibetans who worked there.192 After the PLA suppressed her activities, Thrinley and fifteen
of her followers would be publicly executed in Lhasa, demonstrating Beijing’s supreme authority over
Tibetan affairs.193
The Cultural Revolution devastated Tibet. In 1979-1980 the Dalai Lama sent an investigative
team into Tibet to examine changes that had occurred since he left in exile twenty years before.194 This
search committee was shocked by the terrible economic conditions, but there were calls for a
nationalistic independence movement. There existed a split amongst Tibetans on whether to solve the
issue violently or peacefully. The Dalai Lama ultimately rejected violent measures for a strategy of nonviolence that included internationalizing the issue. The Dalai Lama would travel abroad to spread
knowledge about the situation in Tibet, and use foreign diplomatic pressure along with the human rights
movement to vilify the Chinese. By internationalizing the Tibet issue, he effectively drew sympathy of
many worldwide as Tibet grew in the consciousness of the west. Most importantly he made the issue of
Tibet a sticky-point between the western countries. However, he also withdrew the calls for Tibetan
statehood out of pragmatic necessity.
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The 1980s would feature a dramatic departure from the Maoist leadership as Hu Yaobang took
over the policymaking towards Tibet. From the perspective of Tibetans and the human rights
movement, this period of time marks the long bright spot of Chinese policies toward Tibetans. From the
perspective of Chinese, some saw Hu’s policies as too soft because from a state perspective, allowing
ethnic nationalism to foster is a threat to your own state-led nationalism. Regardless, Hu liberalized the
policies towards Tibet (as he did in Xinjiang) and called for a “Tibetanization” of the cadres. He believed
part of the problem was that Tibetans were not ruling their own land, and tried to promote ethnic
Tibetans within the party leadership. The PLA would also be educated on Tibetan culture and religion to
better understand Tibetan identity. On the thirtieth anniversary of the Seventeen-point Agreement
(1981) he apologized for China’s past mistakes and announced a new beginning in Tibet.195 Most
importantly he realized that what bothered the Tibetans the most were the restrictions on their practice
of Buddhism and the Cultural Revolution failed to assimilate Tibetans into the communist lifestyle. This
is a theme we have noted throughout Tibetan-Chinese relations. Tibetans want to be Tibetans, not
Chinese. A major part of this Tibetan identity is Tibetan Buddhism. Whereas for the Uyghurs in Xinjiang
the practice of Islam makes them different from the Chinese, Buddhism is Tibetan identity and not
merely a distinction from the Chinese identity. Practice of religion in Tibet is far more sacred than
religion in Xinjiang.
It has been noted that much of Tibetan nationalism stems from Chinese policies that were
perceived to be attacking Tibetan identity. However, the liberalization under Hu Yaobang did not seem
to pacify the Tibetans nationalistic conscience. While we can easily argue that Chinese suppression is
the main root for Tibetan nationalism, how then did the nationalism stay alive during Hu’s period of
liberalization? The answer most likely lies in the fact that the damage inflicted on Tibet caused wounds
too deep for liberalization to heal. In 1987 monk-led protests began and the tension culminated in
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martial law from March 7, 1989 until April 30, 1990.196 Martial law was enacted by Deng Xiaoping, and
continued by Jiang Zemin. The arrests of monks by Chinese led for ordinary Tibetans to protest against
the Chinese, thus causing China to enact martial law. This also marks the current pattern of
insurrection/repression in Tibet: monks protest, China arrests the monks for protesting, lay Tibetans
protest the Chinese for arresting monks, and then China arrests more Tibetans. Deng Xiaoping
concluded that Hu’s 1980s liberalization policies of catering to Tibet as a special region needed to end if
stability and unity of the Chinese nation was to be kept.197 It is also important to understand that China
proper was simultaneously trying to find its own identity as it shifted away from Maoist communism
towards an open economy with Western influence, while trying to prevent western influence from
undermining the strength of the Communist party. The infamous incident at Tiananmen Square
occurred during this period, on June 4, 1989. Ultimately martial law would be lifted on Tibet because of
United States pressure, and Jiang Zemin’s desire to help improve US-Chinese relations.198 Recently, on
November 20, 2013, Spain’s National Court issued an arrest warrant for Jiang Zemin and four other top
officials for their human rights violations towards Tibet.199 This is purely symbolic, but it does note the
interest the West has in Tibet, most likely due to the Dalai Lama’s internationalization of the issue. It
also undoubtedly helps fuel China’s perception that the west is interested in containing China to keep it
weak.
Major Tibetan insurrection would not breakout again until 2008. The 2008 rebellion was the
most widespread unrest by Tibetans since the infamous 1959 insurrection.200 The PLA put down the
rebellion through its large military garrison in Tibet which also put down the revolts of 1959, 1969, and
1989. The 2008 insurrection began with several hundred monks from the Dpreprung Monastry calling
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for a relaxing of religious restraints and the release of imprisoned monks while they marched into Lhasa
on the 49th anniversary of the 1959 uprising.201 As would be expected when the police tried to suppress
the protests, ordinary Tibetans attacked them. It should also not be surprising that China clamped down
on these protests because the monks were not just calling for an improvement on policies towards
Tibetans; they were celebrating an anniversary of a rebellion against the People’s Republic of China. By
March 14 the protests turned into ethnic conflict when Tibetans lit Chinese shops on fire and attacked
ethnic Han’s in Lhasa.202 Unlike the 1959 protests, the 2008 insurrection began in the TAR and spread to
ethnic Tibet areas outside the TAR in the regions of Kham and Amdo. By March 16 these regions
protested against Chinese rule and called for Tibetan independence.203
Since 2008 unrest in Tibet has mostly been seen my monks self-immolating themselves. That
being said there have been 120 attempted self-immolation incidents by Tibetan monks since 2009.204
The first self-immolation was by a young monk named, Tapey, in Sichuan province. Tapey would survive
and many monks since have set themselves on fire in acts of protest against the Chinese state. In
response to the wave of self-immolations, the PLA cracked down harder. Most of the self-immolations
have been occurring outside the TAR at ethnic Tibetan areas in Sichuan, Qinghai, and Gansu. According
to one source covering Tapey’s town in Sichuan province:
Chinese officials ordered the People’s Armed Police to surround the monastery; built a
wall to cut off a rear entrance; banned all religious activities; smashed photographs of
the Dalai Lama, the Tibetan spiritual leader; forced monks to attend patriotic reeducation sessions; cut off Internet access; and barred pilgrims from entering. They also
took away 300 monks in a nighttime raid; many of them have not returned.205
China of course likes to blame the Dalai Lama for orchestrating these self-immolations. However, the
Dalai Lama has spoken out against the self-immolations and has urged the monks to stop. The Dalai
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Lama has even stated that he believes they are not working to provide more lenient Chinese policies for
the Tibetans. The Dalai Lama has always been an advocate of non-violence and way will not orchestrate
self-immolations, although he has complemented the monks on their courage to perform such acts.
The current Dalai Lama is 78 years old. It will be interesting to see who succeeds him as the
fifteenth Dalai Lama. There has been talk of the next Dali Lama being a woman or the title been
disbanded. China has also insisted that they will pick and appoint the next Dali Lama. There are four
possible scenarios regarding the next Dali Lama: there being no Dali Lama; there being two Dali Lamas,
one appointed by China and one living in exile; a female Dali Lama appointed by him; or the leader of
another Tibetan Buddhist lineage inheriting the role.206 Regardless it should be a process watched
carefully, especially if Beijing appoints the Dali Lama. This may only create resentment against China for
further trying to destroy Tibetan identity. It also remains to be seen who will become the Panchen
Lama, the second highest lama in Tibetan Buddhism. The last Panchen Lama died in 1989, and it took six
years for the Dali Lama to appoint a young boy as the eleventh Panchen Lama. Following the
announcement, Chinese authorities took the boy into custody and his whereabouts are unknown.
Chinese officials were furious at the Dalai Lama, and then held its own ceremony in Lhasa as they
selected a boy to be the next Panchen Lama. His education is currently being supervised so that Beijing
can control Tibetan leadership. If China tries similar tricks following the appointment of the next Dalai
Lama, Tibetans were sure to be agitated.

206

http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/home/stoi/deep-focus/Will-a-Dalai-Lama-succeed-the-DalaiLama/articleshow/7689131.cms

Parrino 74

Hong Kong and Macau:

207

Hong Kong and Macau are two small Chinese territories that were acquired by imperial
European powers through unequal treaties during the century of humiliation. Both constitute Han
majorities, thus the People’s Republic of China claimed that the territory was rightfully theirs in 1949.
Hong Kong would eventually be returned to China in 1997 and Macao in 1999. While China always
maintained that the territories were in fact Chinese territory it acted with little urgency to regain these
territories. Military force was never used to take the territories away from Great Britain or Portugal.
China’s decision to not make the issue an instant priority was likely influenced by the fact that both
territories were too small to be considered an independent state.208
Great Britain acquired the territories of Hong Kong through three treaties during the century of
humiliation: in the 1842 Treaty of Nanjing Britain received the island of Hong Kong; in the 1860
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Convention of Peking Britain received a small section of fertile farmland on the southern end of the
Kowloon peninsula; and in 1898 Britain received more territory on the Kowloon Peninsula called the
“New Territories.” The “New Territories” would constitute roughly 90% of the Hong Kong Colonial
territory. Unlike the other 10% it was administered by the British on a 99- year lease. The rest of the
colony was to be possessed in perpetuity. The British had tried to renegotiate a continuation of the
lease, but Chinese leaders insisted on the return of sovereignty to China. Eventually Great Britain would
return the territory after the lease ran out, along with the land it had legally possessed in perpetuity.
According to M. Taylor Fravel, China choose to adopt a delaying strategy towards the eventual
reunification for four reasons: First, China had local military superiority over the British; Second, Chinese
leaders believed Taiwan to be the more important dispute that needed to be consolidated first; Third,
Hong Kong provided mainland China with tremendous economic benefits that pressuring Hong Kong’s
return to the mainland could jeopardize; and Fourth China feared that an aggressive policy towards
Hong Kong could result in a US military intervention.209 A fifth and obvious reason for China’s decision
to delay was that Britain’s ninety-nine year lease on the New Territories would expire in 1997. The New
Territories were not owned in perpetuity. International law would mandate the return of the New
Territories to China in 1997, and China could wait until then to consolidate the other 10% of the British
colony. Had the entire Hong Kong territory been ceded to Great Britain, China may have chosen a
different strategy towards reunifying Hong Kong with the mainland.
At the conclusion of the Civil War China elected to not seize Hong Kong despite the military
capacity to do so. In fact the PLA was ordered to not move within 25 miles of the territory.210 It soon
became the official policy of the PRC to not abrogate the unequal treaties that ceded the territory to
Great Britain. They would delay unification until the lease on the New Territories ran out. In October
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1955 Premier Zhou Enlai privately met with the governor of Hong Kong, Sir Alexander Grantham, in
which Zhou insisted that Britain not foster democracy or allow foreign militaries to use the island as a
military base; while not obstructing China’s economic interests or permit KMT activities against the
mainland.211 Following Nixon’s trip to China and the normalization of Chinese relations with Britain in
1972, Hong Kong’s future status remained untouched. The post-1997 status of Hong Kong would not be
discussed between Britain and China until the British raised the possibility of extending the lease in
1982. In 1982 Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher flew to China intent on convincing Deng Xiaoping for
continual British administration of the island. However Deng remained stern that Hong Kong is a
Chinese territory and refused to budge an inch on the issue of Chinese sovereignty of the island.
Eventually the British acquiesced on their position and gave in to Deng’s demand to also return the 10%
of Hong Kong ceded to Great Britain by the Treaty of Nanjing and Convention of Peking. Great Britain
knew it could not defend the island militarily from China, and since the 1950s all of Hong Kong’s drinking
water came from the Province of Guangdong.
In 1984 the two countries released the Sino-Joint Declaration of 1984 in which the entire Hong
Kong colony would be unified with the mainland on July 1, 1997. To appease the British, the people of
Hong Kong, investors, and encourage the eventual reunification of Taiwan, China agreed that Hong Kong
would enter the PRC as a Special Administrative Region (SAR) for fifty years under the premise of “one
country, two systems.” This system would allow Hong Kong to maintain its social system, economic
autonomy and its status as a free port and world financial hub. For the fifty year period the citizens of
Hong Kong would also not pay taxes to the PRC, and English would remain the official language. China’s
strategy of incorporating Hong Kong as a Special Administrative Region is also meant to entice Taiwan
reunification. Beijing hopes to incorporate Taiwan into the PRC as a Special Administrative Region.
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China planned on inheriting the British system of appointing the chief executive of Hong Kong
until British government decided to place a populist president, Chris Patten, to serve as the government
instead of the traditional foreign office diplomat. He introduced 1994 election reforms that Beijing
accused of being designed to dismantle their effort to rule Hong Kong in 1997. China would abolish the
reforms because they believed it would encourage democracy on the mainland and influence separatists
in Tibet, Xinjiang and Tibet.212 On July 1, 1997 Hong Kong officially changed hands. Leading up to the
hand-over a giant clock was resurrected in Tiananmen Square counting down the days, hours and
minutes until China regained full sovereignty over Hong Kong for the first time in 155 years. As of 2013
most people of Hong Kong valued their free way of life and have increasingly accepted PRC rule.213 They
are economically benefitting from China’s economic rise while enjoying their autonomy from the
mainland. Traditionally the people of Hong Kong have been apolitical and pragmatic on the pursuit of
making money. Hong Kong’s financial power also provides them with leverage Beijing.
While the people of Hong Kong have traditionally been apolitical, lately there has been an
escalating battle regarding the future of democracy on Hong Kong. It seems the apolitical identify we
have associated with Hong Kong, may be changing. The island is currently scheduled to vote for their
chief executive for the first time in 2017. However, Beijing seems to be seeking to control who can
actually run. Over the past several months the people of Hong Kong have become more insistent of
having full democratic elections in 2017. On January 1, 2014 thousands protested for full democratic
elections in 2017 so that even Beijing critics to run for office.214 It will be interesting to see how this
battle plays out. Beijing has the power to decide who runs for office, but it may not be in their best
interests to do so. Beijing knows that Taiwan will be watching how democracy plays in Hong Kong. If
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Beijing is determined to control the selection of candidates it may increase Taiwan’s fears of possibly
unifying with the mainland.
Macao’s handover was much smoother than Hong Kong. It too today operates as a Special
Administrative Region . In 1974 following a leftist military coup in Portugal the new Portuguese
government decided to relinquish its colonial possessions. However, Beijing was not ready to
administer the territory and asked Lisbon to continue to administer it. It was agreed that Macao was a
Chinese territory under Portuguese administration and the handover of Macao would be settled
through negotiations. On April 13, 1987 both sides signed a joint declaration modeled after the SinoBritish settlement in 1985 that determined the fate of Hong Kong. They agreed that China would
assume sovereignty over Macao in 1999, negating the 1887 treaty by which the Qing ceded the territory
to Portugal. Today Macao operates as the gambling center of Asia, essentially an eastern version of Las
Vegas. Tourism and gambling are the drivers of Macao’s economy.
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Taiwan:

215

The issue of Taiwan is extremely sensitive to Beijing, and Beijing’s policies towards Taiwan seem
to make the world suspicious that China’s nationalistic rise will be aggressive. The creation of Taiwan
was also the result of Chinese nationalism, as it was founded by the KMT who for a long time held that
they were the sole rulers of China. Taiwan is currently legally administered as the Republic of China but
is internationally recognized by only twenty-one UN member states and the Vatican. The People’s
Republic of China continues to maintain that Taiwan is the 23rd province of the PRC, while Taiwan does
not explicitly state its legal status. China also believes that Taiwan is historically China’s, much like
Xinjiang and Tibet. I aim to prove that China’s claim to Taiwan is also relatively recent and is the result
of conquests under the expansionistic Qing Dynasty. Unlike Xinjiang and Tibet, Taiwan is populated by a
98% ethnic Han majority. The people of Taiwan are searching for their own identity in response to
Chinese nationalism, just as the Tibetans and Uyghurs are. Although ethnically Han, Taiwan is a melting
pot of identities that simultaneously drive the territory towards reunification with China and towards
seeking its outright independence.
Taiwan was first settled by European colonists before the mainland Chinese. The island was
originally named “Formosa” (beautiful island) by Portuguese travelers in the early 1540s, and the Dutch
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would be the first Europeans to colonize the island in 1624.216 The first Europeans to land on the island
would be a shipwrecked Portuguese crew in 1582. At this time the island was home to several thousand
aboriginal tribes and was without influence from mainland China. In fact the island of Taiwan was
traditionally off the Chinese map entirely.217 The importance of this land to China is new, especially
when quantifying the original unification of Chinese territory as the Qin conquest in 221 BC. Chinese
officials during the Ming Dynasty held such distaste for the island that they urged the Dutch to settle
their colony on the island of Taiwan and not the smaller Penghu islands in the Taiwan Strait.218 The
Chinese settlement of Taiwan would not begin until the Ming loyalist Zheng Chenggong (Koxinga)
retreated to Taiwan in 1661. In comparison, the British settlements at Jamestown and Plymouth
predate the Chinese settlement on Taiwan. Zheng Chenggong’s settlement of the island marked the
beginning of ethnic Han political control over the island. It would not be the last time a crumbling
regime would retreat to Taiwan and launch attacks towards the rival regime on the mainland. Chiang
Kai-shek would do the same thing.
Zheng Chenggong the son of a Chinese pirate and his Japanese wife, was born in Japan but
raised in Fujian, China. He began attacking Taiwan in 1661 after abandoning his efforts to reestablish
the Ming Dynasty. He then launched an attack against the Dutch stronghold of Zeelandia (near
contemporary Tainan), besieging forts with 30,000 men against 2,000 Dutch.219 By 1662 he held control
over the island, ending the 38-year reign of Formosa being a Dutch colony. It is often speculated that he
retreated to Taiwan because his power base was across the strait in Fujian, but he may have been
primarily drawn to Taiwan due to the Dutch economic presence there.220 Regardless, he did establish a
short republic that aimed at fiercely fighting the Qing rule. Zheng would die shortly after solidifying
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control over the island in 1662. However, he is tremendously important to Taiwanese history because
he successfully integrated Taiwan into southeastern Chinese culture. Most settlers came from the
province of Fujian and spoke a dialect of Chinese known as Southern Minn. Later ethnic Han who spoke
the Hakka dialect from Guangdong would come and then in the 1940s more mainlanders fled to Taiwan
during the Chinese Civil War. Thus Zheng’s legacy is important because he is the reason of current
ethnic Chinese political control on the island of Taiwan.221
In 1683 the Qing Dynasty would conquer Taiwan, marking the first time in the island’s history
that it would be legally administered from a capital on the mainland. Due to the Fujian connection it
would be placed as a prefecture of Fujian province due to the Fujian connection, and officially enter the
Chinese map.222 It was not proclaimed a province of China. Taiwan would eventually become a province
in 1887 with Taipei as the provincial capital. However, in 1895 the island (along with the Pescadores)
would be ceded in perpetuity to Japan with the Treaty of Shimonoseki. Taiwan then shifted from a
province of China to a Japanese colony, and a very successful Japanese colony at that. Although there
was originally minor resistance, including the ten-day long Republic of Taiwan, order was quickly
established and Japan moved towards its goals of economically developing Taiwan for the benefit of
Imperial Japan.223 During this period Taiwan would become more economically advanced than its
mainland counterparts. However, this economic improvement came with a cost as there was little
respect for Taiwanese identity, leading many to look forward to a day of renewed unification with the
homeland. Japanese was inaugurated as the language of schools, not the standard Chinese or the Min
dialect. The social policies were progressive as Taiwan’s literacy rate, technological skills and world
knowledge was improved to a superior degree compared to the mainland but these policies were
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enacted with little understanding or care for Taiwanese customs and traditions.224 So although Japan
brought order and development they may have affected the growth of a nationalistic sentiment
amongst Taiwanese.225 This correlates with a rising nationalistic sentiment at the turn of the 20th
century amongst Tibetans, Uyghurs, and Han Chinese.
After Japan’s defeat in World War II in 1945, Taiwan was returned to the Republic of China. It
had been agreed at the 1943 Cairo Conference that China would receive this territory back from Japan.
The period following the renewal of Chinese sovereignty to Taiwan was characterized by many emotions
and mixed perceptions. First, some KMT nationalists coming to the island regarded Taiwanese as
traitors for having fought on different sides in the war. A good portion of the Taiwanese had fought in
China (including the Rape of Nanjing) and according to one source 207,183 Taiwanese were conscripted
into military service and 30,304 of them were casualties in the war.226 Many Taiwanese eagerly awaited
the reunion of Taiwan with the mainland and had dreamed of this day. Many of them were
disappointed when they realized how much more advanced they were than their cousins on the
mainland. For example the Taiwanese had become accustomed to using toilet paper to clean
themselves after a bowel movement while those on the mainland were still using bamboo. Joseph R.
Allen summarizes this dichotomy perfectly:
In policy and personality, the Chinese government regarded the Taiwanese, especially
the Japanese-educated elite, with deep suspicion and distrust – as a people who has a
‘slave mentality’ (nuhua jiaoyu). The Taiwanese, on the other hand, came to see the
new Chinese rulers, especially the army and police, as uncivilized boors and brutes.
While the Nationalist forces expected to be seen as comrades who had suffered through
a horrendous war on the continent against the Japanese, the Taiwanese elites expected
to be treated as an educated class who had gained experience and insight into the
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modern world during fifty years of Japanese rule. These worldviews were on a collision
course.227
Under the Japanese system of governance the populous was largely broken down into
Taiwanese (or Islanders) and Japanese. After the fall of the Japanese Empire, the Japanese population
left Taiwan, which was 8% of the population.228 The arrival of the mainlanders in 1945 resulted in two
separate identities: mainlanders and Taiwanese. Both of these identities could be further broken down
into the educated, cosmopolitan elite and the simple, uneducated rural types (including soldiers).229 The
tension between mainlanders eventually broke out on February 28, 1947 and is known as the February
28 (2-28) incident. The violence began in reaction to a government officer unintentionally shooting a
Taiwanese bystander during a protest. The violence would continue for two weeks as the Taiwanese
unleased a year and a half worth of frustration against the mainlanders.230 In response the KMT would
unleash a harsh crackdown against the Taiwanese elite in which thousands were executed. It is truly
unknown how many were executed, but the official count is 6,300 and the popular perception hovers
around 10,000.231 Others counted the number around 20,000.232 This began the decade’s long policy of
“white terror” on the island that suppressed the slightest grain of protest amongst the island. The 2-28
incident would be eliminated from popular discourse until martial law was lifted in the 1980s. Only
since then have the people of Taiwan been able to discuss the 2-28 incident.
In 1949 the KMT would lose the Chinese Civil War and like Zheng Chenggong, retreat to Taiwan
as a base of power to fight against the Communist regime. The retreat to Taiwan was seen as
temporary; it was not seen as a final destination nor a place for Chiang Kai-Shek to establish a republic
for Chinese people. In fact Chiang proclaimed the Republic of China to be the legitimate ruler of all of
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China. Remember, Taiwan was traditionally part of the Chinese homeland, but part of the frontier
incorporated into China by the expansionist Qing Dynasty. The PRC has never for even one day legally
administered the territory of Taiwan. Taiwan’s 390 years since the Dutch colonization in 1624 have
been tumultuous and its international status confusing. Of those 390 years, Taiwan has belonged to the
Han Chinese or Manchu political structure for 302 of those 390 years (77.4%) along with periods of
European and Japanese colonization (1624-1662, 1895-1945). It however has only been administered
by a political entity with its capital on mainland China for 216 (55.4%) of those years (1683-1895, 19451949). Furthermore it has only been administered as a province of mainland China for 12 (3%) of those
years (1887-1895, 1945-1949). Finally it has been legally administered by the PRC for zero of these
years. The PRC believes Taiwan is theirs because they succeeded the Republic of China as the legitimate
ruler of mainland China.
Mao Zedong and the PLA were preparing for a tremendous invasion of Taiwan before the
Korean War prevented these plans. At the time, there was no indication that President Truman would
intervene to prevent the PRC from consolidating its rule over Taiwan. The PLA knew this invasion would
be difficult after their failed capture of Jinmen Island (one of the islands of the ROC off the coast of
Fujian and geographically closer to PRC than Taiwan) in October of 1949, and Chiang Kai-shek’s 1 million
KMT troops that retreated to Taiwan.233 Because Chiang also took much of the Chinese navy and large
merchant marine ships, Mao’s planned invasion required the use of thousands of small boats and to
drop soldiers a mile off shore and swim to Taiwan’s banks.234 Thus Mao trained his army to swim. The
invasion would be further delayed after many PLA troops became ill. After the capture of Hainan Island
in April of 1950, Mao was ready to move on to the final stages of territorial consolidation: Tibet and

233
234

Spence, 471
Cooper, 47

Parrino 85
Taiwan.235 The territory of Outer Mongolia (contemporary Mongolia) would have been included as well
had it not been for Stalin and the Soviet Union who secured an independent Mongolian People’s
Republic. The invasion of Taiwan was set to be undertaken by the PLA Third Army out of Fujian and
Zhejiang, and their commanding general was well aware of how difficult this undertaking would be as
witnessed by his assessment in February 1950:
I must first of all point out that the liberation of the islands along the southern coast,
especially Taiwan, is an extremely big problem and will involve the biggest campaign in
the history of modern Chinese warfare… [Taiwan] cannot be occupied without sufficient
transport, suitable equipment, and adequate supplies. Furthermore a considerable
number of Chiang Kai-shek’s land, sea, and air forces are concentrated there together
with a batch of the most intransigent reactionaries who have fled from China’s
mainland. They have built strong defense works, depending on the surrounding sea for
protection.
The CCP and the PLA did not want to rush the invasion, nor were they willing to allow Chiang to
continue the existence of the Republic of China claiming to be the rightful ruler of the mainland. The
only reason Taiwan was not brought under communist control was because of the US decision to deter
the aggression of North Korea. As mentioned earlier, President Truman ordered the 7th Fleet to
“neutralize” the Taiwan Strait to prevent Mao from seizing the global attention on North Korea to attack
Taiwan. Perhaps his assessment was correct because the PLA would invade Tibet, the other territory it
needed to consolidate. Instead many of the troops positioned for the future invasion of Taiwan would
be transported north for eventual insertion into the Korean War. 30,000 troops from the Third Army
were moved to the area of Mukden area, near the Yalu River.236 It is important to note that Mao did not
lend his support to the North Korean invasion because he thought the risk of American intervention was
too high and that it should wait until after China completed its Civil War with Taiwan.237 He did not think
America would allow communism to expand into both places.
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The American actions during the Korean War helped further Taiwan’s identity from the
mainland by preventing it from unifying with the PRC. This would result in the 1954 US-ROC Mutual
Defense Treaty and American policy of intervention during the three Taiwan Strait Crises of 1954-1955,
1958 and 1995-1996. Without the American defense commitment Taiwan likely would have been
integrated into the PRC. The first two Taiwan Strait Crises of 1954-1955 and 1958 were not actual
attempts by Beijing to take Taiwan, but rather to signal that Beijing was committed to maintaining its
sovereignty claim to the island.238 The third Taiwan Strait Crises resulted from Beijing’s reaction to what
seemed to be the growing sentiment of Taiwanese independence/separatism. These American actions
would secure Taiwan’s fate and identity as being different from the mainland. It would also pave the
way for democratization, which is truly an aspect of Taiwan’s identity distinctly different from the
People’s Republic of China.
The seeds for the First Taiwan Strait Crises were sown when President Eisenhower ordered the
removal of the Seventh Fleet from the Taiwan Strait on February 2, 1953. Chiang Kai-shek decided to
seize the opportunity to move KMT soldiers to the offshore islands of Quemoy and Matsu. Both islands
are just off the shore of the Chinese mainland, and over a hundred miles from the island of Taiwan.
Depending upon viewpoints the islands were Taiwan’s first line of defense, or as Nationalist propaganda
depicted it, the forward operating base for the reconquest of the mainland.239 These islands would
become the foreground for both the First and Second Taiwan Strait Crises. Mao would begin shelling
the islands in August 1954, and it became a crisis of global significance. However, Mao did not want to
incorporate these islands into the PRC because taking them would have severed the Republic of China’s
ties to the mainland. By instigating a crisis, and causing a political response, Mao was able to keep its
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claim to “One China,” and by not taking the islands he prevented a future of two separate China’s. Mao
told Khrushchev:
All we wanted to do was show our potential. We don’t want Chiang to be far away from
us. We want to keep him within our reach. Having him [on Quemoy and Matsu] means
we can get at him with our shore batteries as well as our air force. If we’d occupied the
islands we would have lost the ability to cause him discomfort any time we want.240
The crisis would end after the United States threatened nuclear war with China if they didn’t
back down. This has led some to claim that the real motive behind Mao’s shelling was to create a
situation with such a tremendous risk for nuclear war that Moscow would help assist a Chinese nuclear
weapons program for the purpose of easing the burden of Soviet assistance to Beijing.241
The Second Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1958 would also involve Mao shelling the offshore islands.
After this, Khrushchev would cancel the Nuclear weapons deal. Mao began the shelling without
informing Khrushchev, and Moscow waited until the Taiwan Strait Crises was over to cancel the nuclear
deal.242 The shelling began on August 23, 1958 and would last until early October. Again, this was
largely political and was not meant to agitate a war with the Republic of China. Much like the first
Taiwan Crisis it tested the US commitment to defending Taiwan, increased the international agenda for
China, and kept Chiang Kai-shek committed to the islands near China’s coast. Again Mao brought the
USSR and the US to the threats of nuclear war over small islands with no real significance. Unlike the
first crisis, the aim was also to use an international crisis to strengthen support at home for the Great
Leap Forward. 243 During this time US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles recommended that Chiang
relinquish his sovereignty over the offshore islands in an effort to completely separate the island from
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the mainland, but he did not. It is important to remember that Chiang still had visions of reuniting
Taiwan with the mainland under his Republic, not the Communist party.
Kissinger’s trip to China in 1971 paved the way for improved US-PRC relations, and led to the
change of international recognition towards the PRC as the legitimate ruler of mainland China. That
year the PRC would replace the ROC as China’s international representative at the UN. This of course
included the coveted seat as a permanent member on the UN Security Council. The shift in recognition
left KMT rulers on Taiwan practically realizing that their goal of reunifying China under their rule was
over. Chiang Kai-shek’s death in April 1975 symbolized the final end of Nationalist hope to unify the
country.244 His son, Chiang Ching-kuo, helped lead and engineer the party leadership and would
successfully transition Taiwan from an authoritarian state to a democratic society. On January 1, 1979
Taiwan’s international status was further isolated when the United States severed official diplomatic ties
with Taiwan for the PRC. This coincided with the acknowledgment of the mainland’s One China Policy,
the abrogation of the Mutual Defense Treaty and the removal of US military personal from the island
within four months. However, the US would show its commitment to Taiwan that April when the US
Congress passed the Taiwan Relations Act. This act would show the US commitment to defending
Taiwan, which included the island of Taiwan and the Pescadores (Penghu) Islands just off the coast of
Taiwan. It included no mention to the other offshore islands. However, contrary to conventional belief,
the act does not legally bind the US to defending Taiwan.
During Chiang Kai-shek’s reign, Taiwan began to formulate its own identity from the mainland.
While mainland China was raved by Mao’s Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution, Taiwan
began its economic miracle. During the mid-1960s Taiwan, along with Singapore, Hong Kong and South
Korea would be labeled one of the four Asian Tigers that were experiencing “economic miracles.”

244

Cooper, 50

Parrino 89
Taiwan’s economic success could be contributed to the actions of four different governments, all to
varying degrees: Japan’s leadership from 1895-1945 as a Japanese colony, the US aid to Taiwan from
1951-1965, the PRC’s failure to incorporate Taiwan into the mainland, and the political
stability/monopoly of power by the KMT. As mentioned earlier the Japanese colonial period advanced
Taiwan’s economy and quality of life past that of the mainland. This was especially prevalent in
education where the amount of children in school grew from 66,000 in 1914 to 798,000 in 1944 while
the population only grew from four to six million. Three-fourths of children were in school in 1944, and
by 1949 nearly half the population was literate.245 During the period of Japanese occupation Taiwan’s
economy surpassed all of East Asia, with the exception of Japan.246 Taiwan was also fortunate to be
exposed to modern railroads, telephones, banking and legal systems that protected individual rights and
private property.247 However, the relationship between Japan and Taiwan was still exploitative as
Taiwan was to serve the interest of the mother country, Japan. Taiwan would export far more to Japan
than it would import248 and traded mostly with Japan or the Japanese colony of Manchukuo. World War
II would also spur Taiwanese industrialization to aid Japan’s war effort, and Taiwan was fortunate that
the US bombs largely avoided economic infrastructure on the island.249
The 1945 transition of Japanese to Nationalists power did not go smoothly for the Taiwanese
economy. KMT policies, or the lack of them, would severely damage Taiwan’s economy, along with the
influx of 1.5 million Chinese from the mainland and the defense spending efforts to prevent a PRC
invasion.250 US Security ties and economic aid after the Korean War would allow Taiwan to reallocate
resources towards economic development. To make the economy self-sufficient, Taiwan would also
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follow an import substitution policy, which further led them to industrialize and export. The United
States supported the drive towards industrialization and focus on exports if the KMT would focus on
domestic economic development and not retaking the mainland.251 In 1960 Taiwan officials would agree
and they launched a Nineteen Point Program for Economic and Financial Reform and by 1965 the US
would cease its funding of new aid programs.252 By this time Taiwan’s economy would appear strong
again though the primary factors in this would be US foreign aid (1951-1965), the threat of PRC force,
and KMT political stability. Those three factors seem to have laid the foundations for Taiwan’s export
dependent economic miracle. By the time martial law was lifted in 1987 Taiwan’s economy was the
most trade-dependent in the world, with the exceptions of the city-states of Hong Kong and
Singapore.253
Taiwan’s economic progress and liberalization did not directly coincide with political reforms
and liberalization. While economic liberalization categorically occurred in the 1960s, Taiwan’s
democratization began in the 1980s. It, however, would be a mistake to correlate Taiwan’s
democratization as meaning the same thing as independence. Some who advocated for outright
independence from the PRC were against democratization, and some strong advocates for
democratization were pro-unification.254 Furthermore Taiwan consciousness is not always synonymous
with calls for independence.255 Regardless, the political system in the ROC does make the island of
Taiwan distinctly different from the mainland. The ROC holds local and national elections, and contains
a five-branch system of government that features a combination of the US-system and traditional
Chinese imperial system. It is essentially a west + 2 model where the traditional branches of executive,
legislative and judicial branches exist, along with the Control Yuan (branch) and Examinations Yuan
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(branch). The Control Yuan is a borderline judicial branch that is designed to act as an oversight on
officials, and the Examination Yuan is responsible for administering the traditional civil service exams.256
It, however, would be a mistake to confuse the different political identity to mean Taiwan is different
culturally from the mainland.
Elections began locally in 1950, but would not occur on the national level until 1980. National
elections were not held under Chiang Kai-shek because the ROC claimed jurisdiction over the entire
mainland and could not hold elections on the mainland. In addition Dr. Sun Yat-sen called for a gradual
transition to democracy through economic development. There existed a fear that democratizing too
quickly would ignite political instability.257 Cynics will claim the lack of democracy had more to do with
KMT and Chiang Kai-shek trying to keep its grip on power. Until democratization, the ROC effectively
ruled as a one-party state. After Chiang Kai-shek died in 1975, his song Chiang Ching-kuo would lead the
KMT. He had ruled as Premier since 1972, and would take over as President in 1978 after Yen Chia-kan
resigned. As President, Chiang Ching-Kuo would lead the transition towards democracy. Chiang ChingKuo was completely opposed to independence, saw the mainland as his home, yet was the first to
recognize and promote Taiwanization (promotion of Taiwanese cadres within KMT).258 He would act as
the bridge between his father’s authoritarian rule that preceded him, and the democratization that
followed him.259 This period is effectively known as “soft authoritarianism.”
Chiang Ching-kuo had scheduled the first elections to take place in December 1978, but they
were cancelled abruptly following President Carter’s announcement that the US and the ROC would
cease its diplomatic elections. As a result the election would be rescheduled for 1980. Under Chiang
Ching-kuo’s leadership agreements were reached with the tang wai opposition candidates to ensure a
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genuinely competitive race for parliamentary seats.260 The tang wai was not a party but a loose
conglomerate of politicians bonded together in opposition to the KMT’s role in the political system and
dissatisfaction with Taiwan’s place in the international arena.261 The KMT would dominate the early
elections of 1980, 1981, 1983, and 1985 gathering roughly 70% of the vote and increasing party leaders
confidence.262 In 1986 the tang wai politicians would be organized into the Democratic Progressive
Party (DPP), and the 1986 election would feature the first two-party election on Chinese soil. It was
mainly a Taiwanese party (as opposed to the mainlander KMT party), and native Han-Taiwanese
constituted roughly 85% of the island at this time. At this point the DDP was unsure its policy on the
issue of independence/reunification, as few Taiwanese favored reunification but the moderates seemed
to see no reason to challenge the KMT one-China policy while the radicals wished for some sort of
Taiwan independence.263 The KMT would win the election easily and the following year resulted in the
lifting of martial law that had been in place since 1949 which some called “neocolonial.”264
In 1988 Chiang Ching-kuo would die with Lee Teng-hui taking over party leadership. Chiang
Ching-kuo had groomed Lee to be his successor. Lee Teng-hui was of Hakka descent and would be the
first native born leader of Taiwan. He was Taiwanese, not a mainlander, leading what was known to be
a mainlander party. He would become a tremendous promoter of Taiwanese identity, democratization
and in Beijing’s eyes the epitome of “separatism.” He was determined to increase Taiwan’s image in the
international arena and increase ties to nations that did not recognize official diplomatic recognition of
the ROC. As of November 2013 the ROC is only officially recognized by 22 countries (mostly small ones),
although it maintains 92 representative offices in the major cities in 57 countries, and other countries
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keep over 65 representative offices on the island of Taiwan.265 His commitment to increasing Taiwan’s
international image was witnessed in his first press conference on February 22, 1988 where he
explained that Beijing’s “One Country, Two Systems” is not acceptable because it would reduce Taiwan
to the role of a local government.266 Lee also faced a great deal of adversity in solidifying his own
personal power base and earning the respect of the mainlander elders within the KMT.
In the 1989 election the DDP’s performance would be labeled a “victory” and a “breakthrough”
as they gained more seats since the 1986 election. They would not fare well in the 1991 non
supplemental National Assembly Election due to the poor choice of making Taiwan’s independence a
main issue.267 This was a special election after many elder members resigned, as National Assembly
membership had been intact since 1947 because the ROC refused to hold elections for the Assembly
representing all of mainland China which was undergoing a “communist revolution.” It slowly lost its
power throughout the process of democratization in the 1980s as its powers gradually went to the
Legislative Yuan and finally be defunct in 2005. In 1992 Taiwan would hold an election for all 161 new
members to form the Second Legislative Yuan (the first having lasted from 1947-1991) in which the DDP
would improve from the year before and capture 31.3% of the popular vote while the KMT received only
53.2% of the vote.268 This reflected the common desire for younger, cleaner, and fresher
representatives as several incumbent KMT candidates lost their bids, and most importantly the
continuation of political reforms.269
While many may be against reunification, many are also opposed to outright independence due
to the security threat from the PRC. As evidence of the elections, it is unclear what direction Taiwan will
ultimately go and it is unclear what most want. The threat from the PRC most certainly plays a role, as
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many voters see no reason to advocate for independence and antagonize Beijing. For example, in 1995
the New Party (pro-unification party formed in 1993 by members of the KMT who believed the DDP was
too separatist and championed independence too much, and Lee Teng-hui’s KMT did not support the
reunification of China) tripled their seats (12.5% of popular vote) in the Legislative Yuan election
because of Beijing’s intimidation performing missile tests leading up to the election.270 The New Party
was not wrong in their assessment of Lee Teng-hui’s LMT leadership he did desire to establish Taiwan as
a sovereign state even though he pledged his support for reunification to gather mainlander support.271
In 1996 the ROC would hold its first direct election of the president and vice president, and incumbent
Lee Teng-hui, along with his running mate, Lien Chan, would emerge victorious with 54% of the popular
vote over the DDP and independent party leaders. This event was historic, and a defining moment in
Taiwan’s democratization as the election marked the first time a Chinese leader was democratically
elected. It was also conducted during the Third Taiwan Strait Crises.
Taiwan’s second presidential election in 2000 was even more historic. DDP candidate Chen
Shui-bian beat independent candidate Song Chu-yu (formerly KMT, ran independently after Lee Tenghui did not nominate him), and KMT candidate Lien Chan. It ended the period of KMT rule on Taiwan,
and is generally acknowledged as the completion of democratization on Taiwan. Much like the 1996
election, it was closely watched by Beijing. Beijing was concerned that the trend of democratization
correlated with a growing independence sentiment from the PRC. Beijing was especially concerned with
what appeared to be increasing support for the DDP’s Chen Shui-ben.272 Three days before the election
Premier Zhu Rongyi warned that China would use blood to protect its territory in Taiwan. It seemed that
voters were not intimidated by the Zhu’s warning, much like how in 1996 the missile tests did not
detract voters from voting for Lee Teng-hui. Chen Shui-ban would again defeat Lien Chan in the 2004
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election by a narrow margin (50.1% to 49.9%) keeping power in the DDP’s hands before it transferred
again in 2008 after KMT candidate Ma Ying-jeou defeated DDP’s Frank Hsieh (58.5% to 41.5%).273 It was
of little surprise Ma Ying-jeou won with his promise to ease tensions with Beijing and repair the
relationship with Washington.274 In 2012, the most recent presidential election, Ma Ying-jeou would be
reelected by popular vote.
The waves of voting on Taiwan makes people wonder: what do the people of Taiwan really
want? Do they want unification with China or independence? There is truthfully no concrete answer to
this but for now the majority favors maintaining the status quo. The mainlanders on Taiwan who
support reunification, do not want it in the immediate future.275 When the people on Taiwan were
asked in polls dating from 1996-2008 about immediate unification 1-5% of respondents said yes, while
3-14% said they wanted independence no matter what. 276 The majority favored postponing settlement
through “status quo now, decision later,” “status quo indefinitely,” “status quo now, independence
later,” and “status quo now, unification later.277 It seems that the people of Taiwan are afraid of being
integrated into China and losing their way of life: their style of governance, their lifestyle and their
higher standard of living. If these fears are eased the reaction against unification will dwindle. The
status quo sentiments are also an expression of the desire to avoid armed conflict, which is only
apparent because of Beijing’s claim to maintain Taiwan at all costs. So as much as voters may desire
independence in the hypothetical sense, the current reality is that Beijing will not let that occur. It is
commonly believed that the CCP will fall if they let Taiwan become independent without a fight, and the
people of the PRC care deeply about the Taiwan issue because they have been influence to care by the
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state media and education.278 Most importantly, no Chinese leader can survive “losing Taiwan.” A
leader who unites Taiwan will be honored by history, while one who loses Taiwan will be vilified.
Other important question to consider is whether Taiwan is a part of the Chinese nation, and
whether the Taiwanese identity is distinctly different from being Chinese. Again, these questions do not
have clear-cut answers and are open to interpretation. Taiwan is certainly distinctly different from
Xinjiang and Tibet because the Taiwanese are of the Han ethnicity. The languages spoken on Taiwan are
also all based on the written Chinese language, unlike the Tibetans or Uyghurs. However, the sense of
belonging to the Chinese nation is weaker in Taiwan than in Hong Kong.279 The resistance against being
part of the Chinese nation is most certainly also a response against the mainlander elite that controlled
the Republic of China, the threat from the PRC, and the feeling that mainland China is backward in
comparison to Taiwan. Public opinion polls in 1989 and 2008 indicated that the number of respondents
who “thought of themselves as Chinese,” declined from 54% to 4.2%, the respondents who “thought of
themselves as Taiwanese” rose from 18% to 50.8%, and those who thought of themselves as “both” rose
from 28% to 40.8%.280 In addition the Taiwanese identity is complicated because it can be used to
describe the ethnic Han who reside in Taiwan or it can be used as a distinction against the mainlander
population who came over since 1945. In 1998 the KMT (traditionally a mainlander party) ran on the
campaign theme of the “new Taiwanese,” and Ma Ying-jeou (the current President of the ROC) became
the mayor of Taipei on this slogan.281 He himself was born and raised on Taiwan but his father was a
mainlander who came over after 1949. Today the Han ethnicity populates roughly 98% of the land, with
original aboriginal tribes making up the other 2%. However, the Han ethnicity is traditionally broken
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down into sub-ethnic groups of Taiwanese (84%) and mainlander (14%).282 Mandarin is still the official
language but the Min (Taiwanese) and Hakka dialects are commonly spoken, with Min sometimes being
used an expression of Taiwanese identity. Originally DDP politicians campaigned using Min rather than
Mandarin to depict itself as a non-mainlander party.
No one should believe that the PRC will give up its claim to Taiwan or renounce the right to use
force to enforce their claim. As long as the CCP is in power this will be the case. Beijing hopes to entice
Taiwan into integrating into the PRC under the formula of “one country, two systems,” that has been
outlined in Hong Kong. As far back as 1982 under Deng Xiaoping, China has hoped that the Hong Kong
Model would entice the Republic of China towards reunification. However, during the 1990s Taiwan
moved further away from Beijing under the leadership of Lee Teng-hui. He thought that unification
under Beijing’s terms would reduce Taiwan to local significance and advocated for a “two state theory”
which consisted of Taipei and Beijing having “a special state-to-state relationship.” His advancement of
Taiwan towards becoming an independent sovereign state further agitated Beijing. It was during his
presidency in the aftermath of the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis (1995-1996) and the US response that
Beijing realized it needed to strengthen its military if it wanted to truly have a military option to solve
the Taiwan issue. Since then China has poured much money into its military spending, especially the
Navy, and the Taiwan issue has been at the forefront of this policy. As a result it is fair to assume that
Lee Teng-hui’s legacy will be determined by the fate of Taiwan: if Taiwan becomes an independent
nation he will be applauded as a hero, but if Taiwan is reunited by force history will not be kind to him
because his policies will have helped bring suffering to the people of Taiwan.283
Until the Taiwan problem is resolved, the PLA considers Taiwan its primary war-fighting scenario
and preparation for this task has “absorbed the lion’s share of the military modernization effort since
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the mid-1990s.”284 According to SIRI Chinese defense spending rose from $30 billion in 2000 to almost
$120 billion in 2010 but there is no clear consensus on the exact figure due to the PRC’s opaqueness.285
As a result since 2000 Beijing’s military strength vis-à-vis Taipei and Washington have been increasing.
Beijing’s forces seem to be stronger than Taiwan’s but have yet to catch-up to that of the United States.
The PLA’s planning includes strategies to enforce its claim on Taiwan even with a US intervention.
Although the United States policy is one of “strategic ambiguity,” it is largely believed that the US would
aid Taiwan. In order to prevent an American intervention, China has been investing in “anti-access/area
denial” (A2AD) weapons to prevent, deter, or delay American intervention. These are asymmetric
capabilities that include “thousands of accurate land-based ballistic and cruise missiles, modern jets with
anti-ship missiles, a fleet of submarines (both conventionally and nuclear-powered), long-range radars
and surveillance satellites, and cyber and space weapons intended to ‘blind’ American forces.”286 In the
event of a Taiwan crisis, China desires to keep the United States Navy outside the First Island Chain. In
that sense the Taiwan issue is interlinked with China’s fight for control over the South and East China
Seas because their strategic possession of these sea lanes helps in their effort to consolidate Taiwan.
Also, China is worried about a US Naval blockade in the event of another Taiwan crisis.
There is speculation on what exactly China’s course of action would be in militarily handling the
Taiwan issue. According to the Annual Report to Congress,
It is possible China would first pursue a measured approach characterized by signaling
its readiness to use force, followed by a deliberate buildup of force to optimize the
speed of engagement over strategic deception. Another option is that China would
sacrifice overt, large scale preparations in favor of surprise to force rapid military and/or
political resolution before other countries could respond. If a quick resolution is not
possible, China would seek to: deter potential U.S. interventions; failing that delay
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intervention and seek victory in an asymmetric, limited, quick war; and, fight to a
standstill and pursue a political settlement after a protracted conflict.287
Those findings coincide with the PRC’s previous uses of force throughout its history: It has constantly
signaled its readiness to use force throughout the three Taiwan Strait Crises; it used surprise force to
force a rapid political resolution during its border wars with India, the USSR and Vietnam; and it has
engaged in long protracted conflicts as witnessed in the Chinese Civil War and the Korean War. It is my
belief that China will signal its readiness to use force if they want to create noise or signal their
commitment to use force to resolve the Taiwan issue as seen in the three Taiwan Strait Crises. If China
decides that war is certain, it is likely they will use the principle of offensive deterrence to strike quickly
to gain an edge in hope of reaching a quick political settlement. If China deems US intervention likely,
and is confidant in their own strength it would also be reasonable that they would use their A2AD
weapons to strike first. If a settlement can’t be reached quickly in Beijing’s favor they will fight a long
protracted campaign to ensure it does because this is a civil war.
The status of Taiwan will be determined over the next several decades. Beijing will continue its
policy of building up its military might to strengthen their claim, yet hope they can resolve the issue
peacefully. They also have not slowed down their modernization despite the relaxing of cross-strait
tensions since 2008 and Taiwan remains the primary military focus.288 In 2005 Beijing passed the AntiSuccession Law which is directly aimed at illustrating Beijing’s commitment to unification. Article 8 of
the law states,
In the event that the ‘Taiwanese independence’ secessionist forces should act under any
name or by any means to cause the fact of Taiwan’s succession from China or that major
incidents entailing Taiwan’s secession from China should occur or that possibilities for a
peaceful unification should be completely exhausted, the state shall employ
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nonpeaceful means and other necessary measures to protect China’s sovereignty and
territorial integrity.
Beijing is 100% committed to this law and the idea of reunification. Hopefully the future of Taiwan can
be resolved peacefully in a manner that preserves Taiwanese identity within the Chinese nation, or
Beijing reverses its policy and allows an independent Taiwan.
There are several plausible scenarios for the future of Taiwan with respect of China’s attempt to
consolidate it, and reunify Taiwan with the mainland. First and most preferable would be a peaceful
unification through a negotiation process. This would likely allow Taiwanese to keep their democratic
institutions that they enjoy. Second would be unification by force. This would likely leave lasting scars
on the Taiwanese people that ignite future separatist and antagonistic behavior against Beijing. The
worst-case scenario would be for the mainland to attempt to consolidate its authority over Taiwan by
force, only to be defeated by America’s superior technology and military. As one American think-tanker
told Lee Kwan Yew that would not be the end of the Taiwan issue but rather “the beginning of the
story.”289 It would not be difficult to imagine 1.3 billion Chinese being frustrated after being defeated by
superior technology and united by the urge to show Americans they are not cowards or inferior.290
Considering that the PLA military modernization was ignited by the need for a military option after the
1995-1995 Taiwan Strait Crises and after watching how easily the American military defeated Iraq in the
first Gulf War with superior technology, it is reasonable to suspect such a result. A failure to reunify
Taiwan with the mainland would also create domestic instability, considering the CCP has made Taiwan
reunification part of its ideology and legitimacy.
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South and East China Seas:

291

China’s territorial claims in the South (Spratly and Paracel Islands) and East China Sea (Senkaku
Islands) are the source of tremendous regional tension. China claim to the Spratly islands is disputed by
Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan and Vietnam who also claim the archipelago. The Paracel
Islands are also claimed by Taiwan and Vietnam. In the East China Sea China is locked in a territorial
dispute over the Senkaku (Diaoyu in Chinese) with Japan, but Taiwan also claims the islands. At stake
for China is fishing fights, control over shipping lanes, and a vast potential for resource extraction from
the Sea. In February 1992 Beijing passed the Law on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone which
states:
The land territory of the PRC includes the mainland of the PRC and its coastal islands,
Taiwan and all islands appertaining thereto including the Diaoyutai [Senkaku] Islands,
the Penghu Islands, the Dongsha Islands, Xisha [Paracel] Islands, Zhongsha Islands and
the Nansha [Spratly] Islands as well as other islands belonging to the PRC.292
Beijing often cites this law as evidence to support its claim to the offshore islands. Historically
China’s believes that the South China Sea is China’s “southern sea,” hence it received the name nan hai
(south sea) in Chinese. Beijing operates from the perception that the South China Sea has always been
291
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an internal lake of China. It claims the sea has been China’s since the Han Dynasty in the second century
A.D.293 Today Chinese maps and newspaper regularly print maps that show the maritime borders
extending across the entire South China Sea to the Indonesia Island of Borneo.294 The “nine-dotted line
map,” originally published by the Nationalist government in 1947 and republished by Beijing in 1992,
shows the Chinese claims in an arc of nine long dashes around the entire South China Sea.295 These
claims worry China’s southeastern neighbors who also make claims to islands in the sea. The conflicting
claims combined with the fast expansion of the Chinese navy, makes the South China Sea a constant
source of tension in Asia.
China’s 1992 law was not the first time China claimed sovereignty over the South China Sea.
Beijing has believed the sea and its islands to be China’s since the creation of the PRC. China has never
compromised its sovereignty over an offshore island with the exception of White Dragon Tail Island in
1957 to North Vietnam.296 The island lies in the middle of the Tonkin Gulf. Very little is known about
this settlement, but it is believed Mao Zedong transferred the island to North Vietnam to aid its
ideologically ally against their mutual enemy, the United States.297 However this was before the region
realized the potential economic benefits owning the islands possessed. Ownership of islands and its
surrounding sea presents states with control of important shipping lanes and the opportunity to exploit
the potential oil and gas resources that lay under the sea. The islands at stake are the Spratly and
Paracel Islands. Thus Admiral Liu Huaqing the former People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) and
founder of the modern Chinese navy famously claimed “whoever controls the Spratlys will reap huge
economic and military benefits.”298
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China’s memory of the “century of humiliation” haunts its perception whenever dealing with
territorial disputes. This period from the beginning of the First Opium War to the creation of the
People’s Republic of China was marked by decay as foreign powers slowly dwindled away at Chinese
territory. England, France, Portugal, Germany, Russia and Japan all gained control of Chinese territories
through war, negotiations and concessions. The unequal treaties that consolidated these territorial
gains are haunt China when its claims to the Spratly and Paracel Islands are questioned. This could best
be described by Shee Poon Kim’s statement that
In assessing China’s conception of the sea and its strategic thinking towards the South
China Sea, it is important to note that many leading Chinese analysts perceive China as a
victim of sovereignty disputes over the Spratly Islands. From China’s perspective, there
is no issue over sovereignty in the Spratlys as these islands belong to China. As such, the
disputing states have ‘robbed’ China of its precious hydrocarbon resources, besides fish
and other seafood resources in the South China Sea.299
China is determined to not ignore even minor violations of its territorial integrity because this
could be a slippery slope towards encroachment on Chinese territorial integrity.300 Thus since its
founding the PRC’s main priority has been to protect its sovereignty and territorial integrity.
To protect its sovereignty and territorial integrity China has labeled several areas a “core
interest.” In March 2010 High-ranking Chinese officials labeled the South China Sea as a “core interest”
during a private meeting with US diplomats, and Hilary Clinton re-affirmed this claim after a May 2010
meeting.301 Although Beijing has refrained from using these words in a public setting, they are
important in understanding the importance China places on protecting its maritime claims in the South
China Sea. According to Toshi Yoshiha, an associate professor of strategy at the US Naval War College,
“declaring such an interest would seemingly elevate the strategic importance of that body of water to a
level reserved for Taiwan, Tibet and Xinjiang –territory that is integral to China’s vision of itself as a
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nation and that must be protected at all costs.”302 However, no foreign country claims Taiwan, Tibet and
Xinjiang (with the possible exception of Taiwan claiming itself as an independent country) as their
territory; which makes the South China Sea claim extremely controversial with dangerous implications.
If China truly believes that its territorial claims in the South China Sea must be protected at all costs,
then China will be willing to fight Southeast Asian countries who also claim those islands. A “core
interest” position leaves no room for compromise over the sovereignty of the South China Sea.
China has consolidated its islands claims by force in the past. In 1974 the PLAN clashed with
South Vietnamese forces seizing the Crescent Group in the western sector of the Paracels; in 1988 PLAN
forces fought the Socialist Republic of Vietnam’s Naval Forces at Johnson Reef in the Spratly Islands then
went on to claim six other reefs claimed by Vietnam and the Philippines; and in 1994 China occupied
Mischief Reef in the Spratlys without conflict which is also claimed by the Philippines. Conflicts over
offshore islands only began in the 1970s directly coincided with the growing of importance of possessing
these islands. The race for maritime resources began following a 1969 seismological survey in the East
China Sea determined that precious resources laid along the Senkaku Islands.303 This increased the
economic interest to securing maritime rights to the islands. Today the economic benefits include the
potential for vast resource extraction and fishing rights, especially if China can use these islands to claim
an Exclusive Economic Zone up to 200 nm under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. This is
especially interested because the CCP’s legitimacy is based upon economic improvement.
The 1974 clash with South Vietnam was preluded by intense competition between South
Vietnam and China over the Spratlys and Paracels due to the growing importance of controlling these
islands. The two countries navies clashed on the morning of January 19, 1974, and China took
advantage of the clash to seize the Western sector of the Paracels. Before the clash, on January 11,
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China’s Foreign Ministry issued a statement challenging the South Vietnamese assertion over their
administration of the Spratlys. According to Taylor Fravel, China ordered a patrol to the Crescent Group
on January 16 with the idea of convincing Vietnam to accept a status quo of China controlling the islands
and if possible convince South Vietnam to abandon its position on Pattle Island.304 They were instructed
to only fire if fired upon, and engage Vietnam in a “struggle of persuasion” to accept China as the
sovereign rule.305 The naval patrol prompted a naval build-up by both sides that culminated in a clash
on the 19th. After the clash the Politburo ordered PLAN forces to seize the entire Crescent group from
Vietnam and take advantage of the moment. 306
On March 14, 1988, China would engage with Vietnam on Johnson Reef in the Spratly Islands.
The conditions of the conflict were staged by China’s assertive decision in 1987 to occupy Fiery Cross.
This was done in order to make a physical presence in the disputed Spratlys.307 Vietnam’s response to
China’s occupation was to occupy the five reefs surrounding Fiery Cross in late January and early
February of 1988. This led to a series of three confrontations on January 31, February 18 and March 14,
with the final conflict being deadly resulting in the deaths of seventy-four Vietnamese sailors.308
According to Taylor Fravel, just like in 1974 China again did not set out with the plan of attacking
Vietnamese ships.309 They intended to seize Fiery Reef, which was unoccupied, to consolidate their
territorial claims. This assertive decision created the conditions for the clash, as China challenged the
status quo in the region. Just like in 1974 China sought to politically alter the regional status-quo and
enhance their territorial strength to the islands and the end result was a minor armed conflict with the
country challenged by China’s claim. This is important to understand the potential for future island
conflicts to occur. China’s move into the Spratlys prompted Vietnam to contain China’s presence,
304

Fravel, 281
Fravel, 281
306
Fravel, 283
307
Fravel, 288
308
Fravel, 288
309
Fravel, 288
305

Parrino 106
increasing the odds for conflict and leading to the unplanned naval battle. However, it is important to
note that unlike 1974, China did not feel seize the opportunity and attack other Vietnamese occupied
islands in the Spratlys.310
China’s entrance into the Spratlys was also influenced by the PLAN’s own bureaucratic interests.
They wanted to capitalize on the growing importance Deng Xiaoping placed upon the South China Sea as
he shifted his goals from geo-strategic to geo-strategic and geo-economic.311 With this shift the PLAN
began to argue how its mission directly coincided with the plan for economic modernization, as these
missions provided a rationale for budgetary increases.312 Not only did controlling the sea yield economic
benefits for resource extraction and fishing rights, in 1979 Deng Xiaoping decided to open up China to
foreign investment to improve the lives of the Chinese people. It is not an accident that offshore
petroleum drilling was the first industry Deng opened to foreign investment.313 Also, the economic
center shifted away from inland regions towards the coastal regions. Special Economic Zones were
opened along the Southeastern coast as centers of investment to lure overseas Chinese business into
China since most of the overseas Chinese hailed emigrated from Southeastern China. The original
Special Economic Zones were intentionally placed near Honk Kong, Macau and Taiwan.
In 1994 the PLAN would establish a permanent structure on Mischief Reef in the Spratly Islands.
The reef was also claimed by the Philippines and Vietnam. The Philippines discovered the structure in
February 1995 after Chinese sailors drove away Filipino fisherman there. While this occupation was
gained without force, it is worth noting for the purpose of better understanding the Chinese
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consolidation of territory. Preceding this occupation was intense competition between neighboring
states over the ownership of island features along with drilling rights for energy exploitation.314
While controlling the South China Sea clearly yields economic benefits for China, it is also of
great strategic value. A strong naval presence in the South China Sea is directly related to China’s main
“core interest,” defending its territorial claim to Taiwan. China fears that if it has to defend its claim to
Taiwan, the UN Navy will come to the aid of Taiwan. China fears that the US Navy might not only
militarily aid Taiwan, but block Chinese imports from reaching Chinese shores. To prevent this China
must control the South China Sea since most of its shipping transverses through the Strait of Malacca
and the South China Sea. Chinese Naval plans consist on preventing US access within the First Island
Chain which runs from the Southern tip of Japan, to Okinawa, to Taiwan and to the Philippines. To
prevent foreign access into the First Island Chain, China must be able to control both the South and East
China Seas, along with the islands within them.
Toshi Yoshihara presents and an interesting comparison to understand China’s growing naval
power claims of a core interest in the South China Sea. He claims that some in China view the South
China, East China, and Yellow Seas (known as “the three seas” or “the near seas”) in the same way that
the 19th-century Americans regarded the Caribbean Sea and the Gulf of Mexico: essential for domination
for the United States to realize its political and commercial potential.315 In fact just as Alfred Thayer
Mahan saw controlling the Gulf essential for building a Central American Isthmus, a vital sea passage to
the Pacific, today Chinese naval strategists see controlling the South China Sea as key to having a transit
point through the Strait of Malacca and into the Indian Ocean. Control of the Gulf, Caribbean and the
Panama Canal were essential in strengthening America’s political, economic and military might.
However, China’s situation is much different from 19th-century US. America was fortunate to have the
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major world powers be stationed across the Atlantic, while contemporary China lives in a dangerous
neighborhood with many powers, including the United States.
China has gone about strengthening its position in the South China Sea through not only military
maneuvers but diplomatic maneuvers. The Chinese diplomatic strategy for engaging in disputes has
been mostly through bilateral discussions that outsiders have depicted as “salami tactics” or realpolitik.
China prefers to talk with one country at a time, and not deal with ASEAN as a whole. While it agrees
with ASEAN on maintaining the region status-quo, China always seeks to deal with other claimant states
bilaterally and pre-empt third party intervention.316 This may be due to the memory of the century of
humiliation. Working with all states in a collective forum would only harm China’s interest in controlling
the entire South China Sea because all other claimant states share a common fear of Chinese
expansionism and bullying. While engaging in bilateral talks, China has yet to ever cooperate on island
disputes with the exception of Mao’s transfer of White Dragon Tail Island in 1957. China prefers to
delay all settlements with the belief that time will only strengthen China’s position as the People’s
Republic of China grows stronger economically, politically and militarily. Deng’s famous maxim, “hide
our capacities and bide our time,” rings true here. China wants to build its strength and wait until it can
enforce its position on East Asia: moving too assertively can undermine the Chinese position.
In 1988 China upgraded the territory of Hainan to provincial status and assigned all islets, reefs,
and atolls it claimed in the South China Sea under Hainan’s administrative order with the hope of
reinforcing its territorial claims.317 Recently Hainan enacted a regulation that non-Chinese fishing
vessels wanting to operate in the South China Sea must obtain permission from China’s central
government.318 The rule took place on 1 January 2014 and it remains to be seen how enforcement will
take place. Scholars and diplomats suggest that enforcement, for now, will be limited to the sea
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surrounding the Paracel Islands.319 These islands are closer to Hainan than the Spratlys, and China has a
presence there. Hainan is a key player in Beijing’s South China Sea strategy not only for its
administrative functions that provide legal justification for Chinese behavior, but because it holds a key
Naval base.
China is also locked in a dispute over the Senkaku Islands with Japan. On February 19, 2014 US
Naval intelligence analysts released a report stating they believed China was preparing for a “short,
sharp war” with Japan over the Senkaku Islands. Susan Shirk explains that China has a difficult time
handling domestic resentment against Japan because it ignites patriotic feelings among Chinese and
anger for the atrocities committed by Japan during World War.320 Her chapter on Japan is entitled
“Japan: ‘When the Chinese People Get Angry the Result is Always Big Trouble.’”321 The Chinese media
and public are especially sensitive to the legacy of Japanese atrocities committed in World War II, the
lack of coverage in Japanese textbooks for its wartime atrocities, and Japanese leader visits to the
Yasukuni Shrine in Tokyo that honors Japanese war dead (including war criminals). This is especially
worrisome to China. This past summer on a key anniversary (August 15, 2013) Japanese Prime Minister
Shinzo Abe and his top officials listened to the advice of Chinese, American and South Korean leaders
and avoided visiting the Yasukuni Shrine.322 While he did not go 175,000 people went; an increase from
161,000 which some link to territorial tensions with China.323 However, much to the dismay of China, on
December 26, 2013 he visited the Yasukuni Shrine.
China’s hatred of Japan is burdened by history and its humiliating defeats in the Sino-Japanese
War of 1894-1895 and the Anti-Japanese War of 1931-1945. The Treaty of Shimonoseki ended the Sino-
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Japanese War and China gave Taiwan to Japan and lost its control of independent Korea to Japan.324
Japan would immediately make Taiwan a colony and Korea in 1910. The colony of Korea would provide
the basis of Japan’s invasion into Manchuria and China. The negotiator of this treaty, Li Hongzhang, has
gone down in infamy and his name is used as insults to accuse people as being traitors to their
country.325 However he has recently been acknowledged for his skill in ending the rivalry and pitting
Russia against Japan in Manchuria (which would lead to the Russo-Japanese War in 1904) but China is
still hostile about his concessions of Chinese land to foreigners.326
Today’s territorial tension is directly linked to the Treaty of Shimonoseki and concerns the
islands referred to as Senkaku in Japan and Diaoyu in China. The islands are roughly 120 nm northeast
of Taiwan and 240 nm southwest of Okinawa.327 In 1895 Japan believed these islands were ceded to
them in the treaty along with Taiwan and Korea. Japan would control the islands until the end of World
War II, and then the United States administered them until they were returned to Japan in 1972.328
China believes these islands have historically been China’s and linked to Taiwan. Dispute over
sovereignty only arouse in 1969 when Japanese geologist discovered an underwater oil field which was
believed to be one of the ten largest in the world.329 In this dispute China has consistently chose to
delay achieving a settlement. During negotiations for a 1978 Peace Treaty both sides discussed the
islands only to decide to exclude it from the agreement.330 Concerning the issue Deng Xiaoping said: “It
doesn’t matter if this question is shelved for some time, say, ten years. Our generation is not wise
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enough to find common language on this question. Our next generation will certainly be wiser. They
will certainly find a solution acceptable to all.”331 These islands have military and economic significance
that naturally make them desirable and the tension is compounded by history, pride, patriotism and
great power rivalry.
The Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands are also important to China for its defense of Taiwan. Control over
the islands builds a buffer outside Taiwan and prevents rival Japan from controlling territory close to
Taiwan. Also, the islands lie within the First Island Chain which China perceives as its imaginary defense
line it needs to be able to defend in the event of foreign assistance over a Taiwanese conflict. China
looks to enforce its first-island chain policy by land, air and sea and recently claimed a no-fly zone over
the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. On November 23, 2013 China claimed the air over these islands as an “air
defense zone.” This has caused a renewed tension between Sino-Japanese relations and also involves
the military of the United States. On Monday November 25, 2013, the United States intentionally flew
B-52s over the “air-defense zone” in response to China’s claim. However the United States claims the
mission was planned long in advance of China claiming it an “air-defense zone.”
Both the South and East China Seas are potential flashpoints for conflict. China will enjoy
economic and military benefits if they control the seas. The economic benefits are worth noting
because the CCP’s legitimacy is linked to increasing the economic power of China and there plenty of
natural resources surrounding the islands in contention. The military benefits are important to China
because control of these seas improve China’s ability to consolidate its control over Taiwan. Based on
the previous uses of force by China, it is likely that China would initiate conflict through the use
preemptive deterrence, or offensive deterrence if it feels that war is inevitable. Until the day arrives, if
it does, China will seek to negotiate bilaterally with states. However, China will likely try to delay
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reaching a settlement under the assumption that time is on China’s side. While both areas are potential
flashpoints, conflict is more likely to break out over the Senkaku Islands because of China’s bitter rivalry
with Japan and the islands proximity to Taiwan.
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Conclusion:
The People’s Republic of China’s behavior towards consolidation and especially the
consolidation of its borders has many factors: The Qing Dynasty’s expansion of China’s borders into nonethnic Chinese territory; the memory of the loss of Chinese territory through “unequal treaties” during
the century of humiliation; Chinese nationalism’s desire to create a state led by the ethnic-Han with its
borders at the maximum extent of Qing governance; the CCP’s current legitimacy, based upon economic
improvement; and the unfinished Civil War that has left Taiwan separated from the mainland. China’s
behavior towards all regions is assertive, not aggressive or expansionistic, and reflective of the desire to
reunify Taiwan with the mainland. Taiwan’s de facto independence from the mainland represents a
fragmented, disunited China that in Beijing’s mind must change. Thus Chinese consolidation policy
towards Xinjiang, Tibet, Hong Kong, Macau, Taiwan and the disputes in the islands within the South and
East China Seas are all driven in part by the need to reunify Taiwan with the mainland.
After examining China’s territorial consolidation, where can we place the borders of China? The
answer to that question is directly related with understanding what it means to be Chinese. This is not
an easy task. It should, however, be apparent that being Chinese is not as simple as being a citizen of
the PRC, nor a resident on the territory claimed by China. Clearly the most important aspect of Chinese
identity is the written Chinese language. China’s struggle to incorporate Uyghurs and Tibetans into
Chinese culture reflects this. Regardless of the dialect spoken, inclusion into Chinese identity involves
speaking one of the Chinese dialects. After all it is the direct descendent of the writing system used by
the Shang Dynasty (1600-1046 BC).332 Furthermore the use of characters instead of an alphabet makes
it distinctly different from other languages. In China, language may be more an element of culture than
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any other culture. Chinese take a tremendous amount of pride in their language and are always in awe
of foreigners attempting to learn it. Language is not only a method of communication but central to
Chinese identity and expression of culture.
Chinese identity is also obviously related to the Han ethnicity. Chinese nationalism is directly
connected to Han chauvinism and it would not be wrong to categorize Chinese nationalism as a tad
racist. Dr. Sun Yat-sen and the Revolutionary Alliance fought to overthrow the foreign-Manchu Qing,
and restore “Chinese” rule to China. Even though Manchuria is within the contemporary boundaries of
the PRC, it was considered foreign because the Manchus are not Han Chinese. That racism lives today as
Chinese leaders constantly chastise expressions of other identities and cultures. In Beijing’s eyes, being
Uyghur or Tibetan means one is not Chinese, and threatens the unity of the state.
History and geography also constitute important aspects of Chinese identity. Chinese trace the
beginning of their civilization to the legendary Yellow Emperor who ruled in the third millennium BC.
China itself traces its initial unification as a political state to 221 BC under the Qin Dynasty. It can be
argued that no existing country traces its history continuously that far back. Successive generations
spread from the yellow river valley, the cradle of Chinese civilization, outward as the Chinese people
spread. They spread south and east towards the seas where the heart of the population lives, much
more than they spread west. Chinese states typically held its capitals in the east and viewed the far
west, contemporary Xinjiang, to be nothing but mountains and desert. The core parts always faced
eastward and held its back on the middle part of the Eurasian continent.333 China’s traditional view of
its western expanse is evident in that Xi’an was the beginning or end of the Silk Road connecting Central
Asia to China. The Chinese political state’s expansion of the border westward and incorporation of Tibet
and Xinjiang is the direct result of the expansionistic Qing Empire.
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Defining Chinese identity along lines of Han ethnicity, Chinese language, Confucian culture,
dynastic history and geography helps us determine the borders of China. These are no means strict,
absolute definitions for Chinese identity, but it provides a tremendous amount of insight into the core of
the Chinese nation. Thus when defining the borders of the Chinese nation several conclusions can be
drawn: First it is very difficult to include the debates over sovereignty of the offshore islands in this
discussion because it is not inhabited by people and it is impossible to determine who rightfully deserves
sovereignty over the islands. Second, Tibet clearly should be considered outside the borders of China.
Tibetans do not want to be Chinese; they wish to retain their own identity as Tibetans which for the
most part this includes being Tibetan Buddhist. Tibetans speak a different language and have a different
history. While China is bonded by its dynastic history, Tibetans were bonded by the subservience to the
Dalai Lama who has been the political and spiritual leader for Tibetans since the 15th century. Since the
fifth Dalai Lama, the Dalai Lamas have often acted as the political leader of a unified Tibet. Following
the collapse of the Qing Dynasty, Tibetan nationalism helped stir the creation of a de facto independent
Tibetan stat under the thirteenth Dalai Lama. China has been able to consolidate its sovereignty over
Tibet but met with resistance.
Despite China’s success at consolidating Tibet by force, it has faced a tremendous amount of
difficulty winning over the will of the people. While all political geography is consolidated by force
governments cannot maintain control over said territory with force. Such is the case in Tibet where
Tibetans have not been assimilated into the Chinese culture. In fact it seems that China’s attempt to
consolidate its authority in Tibet as only further distanced Tibetans from the Chinese state. Instead of
destroying nationalism, China’s policies have increased Tibetan nationalism and a sense of Tibetan
identity. Since the 1959 uprising Tibetans have continued to demonstrate against the PRC authority and
look to the exiled fourteenth Dalai Lama as the leader of the Tibetan people. The CCP has vilified him,
labeled him a “wolf in monk’s robe,” and looks to the Dalai Lama as the leader of Tibetan separatism.
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The Dalai Lama’s internationalization of the Tibetan issue has successfully brought the Tibetan cause for
independence into the consciousness of the international community. Human rights groups and
western governments wish to see a freer Tibet that is less constrained by Chinese control. Although the
Dalai Lama has mostly been able to keep the protests for Tibetan freedoms non-violent, it remains to be
seen what will happen when after he passes. If China insists upon appointing his successor, or
abolishing the position they could an increase in Chinese nationalism and make it more difficult to
consolidate Tibet.
Like Tibet, Xinjiang’s incorporation into China is the result of the Qing Dynasty’s western
expansion and the PRC’s desire to proclaim their borders at the maximal extent of Qing governance.
The case in Xinjiang is different from the Tibet Autonomous Region. Unlike Tibet, Han Chinese are
moving into Xinjiang. Tibet still contains a 92% Tibetan majority and has not fallen victim to Han
migration. Xinjiang, however, is a territory ethnically divided and since 1949 has become more Chinese.
As of the 2000 National Population Census the territory is divided ethnically with 40% Han, and 45%
Uyghur. Population estimates vary in terms of ethnic breakdown and total population but there seems
to be a total of over 21 million people with a rough 45:40 breakdown of Uyghur vis-à-vis Han. This is
remarkably different from the ethnic breakdown in 1945 that featured a population of 3.6 million
people with an 82.7% Uyghur Majority and 6.2% Han Minority.334 Since the PRC has consolidated its rule
over Xinjiang, the “new frontier,” has become more Chinese. The population demographic center has
also shifted northward, away from the southwestern section of the province, because the of the Han
concentration in the northern urban centers of Xinjiang – Urumqi, Karamay, and Shihezi. However much
of the southwestern section is still populated by an Uyghur majority. Although Xinjiang has fallen victim
to Sinicization, it does not mean that the entire populous wishes it to become such, rather since 1990
Xinjiang has been the source of tremendous interethnic tension that has erupted into violence at times.
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Xinjiang is a region divided. The tension in Xinjiang is only getting worse but still lacks unified
leadership. The Uyghurs are growing further disenchanted from the Chinese state and will continue to
use violence to voice their frustration. Due to the difficulty to smuggle weapons into the region
separatist Uyghurs are doing whatever they can to attack China. Most recently, on March 1, 2014
Uyghur separatists launched a knife-wielding attack at a railway station in the Chinese city of Kunming,
Yunnan, which left 29 civilians dead. China will continue to face difficulty in consolidating Xinjiang as the
separatist sentiment rises.
Hong Kong and Macau are most certainly part of the Chinese nation. They are within the
traditional Chinese homeland and contain substantial Han majorities. While the people of Hong Kong
certainly have their own identity it is not one that is threatening to Beijing with separatist occupation.
The people of Hong Kong wish to keep their personal freedoms and their ability to make money. It
would be wrong to categorize Hong Kong as not Chinese on the basis of a different economic and
political model without CCP administration. Due to the findings that being is ethnically and linguistically
determined; they must be placed within the borders of China.
Taiwan is an entirely different story. Valid arguments can be made for Taiwan being part of the
Chinese nation and equally valid arguments can argue that Taiwan is its own distinct nation of
Taiwanese. Taiwan is culturally and historically tied to the mainland, politically moving away from
Beijing, while economically being pulled towards the mainland. The people living on the island of
Taiwan are torn about the issue of independence or reunification, and torn on whether or not they are
Chinese. It could be also argued that Taiwan is more “Chinese” than the mainland due to its 98% Han
majority in comparison to the 91.5% Han majority in the PRC. It is likely that the Taiwan issue would be
a non-issue if it were not for the Korean War. Were it not for the insertion of a US aircraft into the
strait, Mao Zedong would have been able to seize Taiwan and incorporate CCP rule.
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By no means should there be definitive lines drawn around this “China” we speak of, but a
rough outline of the borders should include Hong Kong, Macau, Taiwan and most of Xinjiang. When
defining China along ethnic, linguistic, cultural, historic and geographic lines, Tibet simply cannot be
considered part of China. China is in my eyes what it always was: the geographic spread of ethnic Han
peoples speaking Chinese dialects outward from the Yellow River valley. However instead of dynastic
emperors attempting to consolidate control over the territory these people live in, it is the CCP. Lucian
Pye’s assertion that China was a civilization pretending to be a nation-state still rings true. It will be
interesting to see how this state changes over time. Beijing will continue to face ethnic unrest in Tibet
and Xinjiang as long Chinese administer these territories. In both cases China’s own policies seem to
further ignite nationalistic sentiment amongst the Uyghurs and Tibetans. However it would be ignorant
to think Beijing would easily, if ever relinquish its claims to these western territories. Xinjiang is simply
too important for its multitude of natural resources, its stock of Chinese nuclear weapons, its connection
to Central Asia through a modern day Silk Road, and its tremendous Han presence. Tibet also has
natural resources that Beijing wishes to exploit, though not as much as Xinjiang.
The CCP’s current legitimacy to rule is based mainly upon its success at increasing the standard
of living of Chinese. They have done an excellent job increasing China’s wealth: In 2012 China had a GDP
of $8230 Billion compared to $1200 Billion in 2000, and a GDP per capita of $3,348 per capita as
opposed to the $1,122 per capita in 2000.335 According to Bruce Gilley’s 2006 study the PRC ranked 13th
internationally in legitimacy (Taiwan was 12th) ahead of other notable countries such as Britain, Japan,
South Korea and France.336 Anne-Marie Brady asserts that the CCP administers China through popular
authoritarianism in which the CCP bases its legitimacy on economic growth and its emphasis on
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persuading the Chinese people that the CCP is accomplishing this.337 Through her research she found
that the majority of Chinese accept this system even though many disapprove certain aspects of their
governance.338 One Chinese professor I interviewed stated that the government had done a
tremendous amount for its citizens over the past decade, but still had much work to be done. The CCP’s
goal of legitimizing its rule through economic improvement will continue to drive the tension in Xinjiang:
Han Chinese will continue to get rich while the Uyghurs do not, and Uyghurs will continue to get
frustrated by the Han migration and Chinese resource exploitation. Furthermore the CCP’s goal of
legitimizing its rule though economic improvement makes the resources in the South and East China Sea
more desirable and drives Chinese policy towards consolidating the offshore islands.
It will be interesting to see if China’s attempt to consolidate Taiwan brings about domestic
political changes on the mainland. Democracy is succeeding in Taiwan and valued as part of the
Taiwanese way of life. Part of the fear of reunification with the mainland is that Taiwan would lose their
democratic institutions. In order to peacefully complete reunification, the PRC will likely have to allow
democracy to flourish on Taiwan. Hong Kong also features aspects of democratic institutions. It will be
interesting to watch if the Chinese attempt to consolidate these two territories brings about some form
of democracy on the mainland.
It would be wrong to depict Chinese nationalism as aggressive simply because it is struggling to
consolidate its territorial claims. While China is by no means an advocate for self-determination, their
consolidation behavior is assertive in attempting to maintain the territorial integrity of what they believe
is rightfully China and afraid of it becoming fragmented. The best model for understanding assertive
Chinese nationalism may come from the use of the rattlesnake in America’s early history. In 1754
Benjamin Franklin printed the famous “Join or Die” political cartoon (first in American history) showing a
337
338

Brady, Anne-Marie, “Mass persuasion as a Means of Legitimation and China’s Popular Authoritarianism,”
http://students.washington.edu/nupsa/Docs/Volume5/McGinnis.pdf

Parrino 120
snake divided into eight-parts, with each part symbolizing a region of the American colonies. The
purpose was to illustrate the disunited state of the colonies and to emphasize the need to come
together and aid the British in the French-Indian War. The cartoon would then take on its role as an
expression of colonial patriotic fever leading up to the American Revolution. Benjamin Franklin
explained his decision to use the rattlesnake as follows:
I recollected that her eye excelled in brightness, that of any other animal, and that she
has no eye-lids. She may therefore be esteemed an emblem of vigilance. She never
begins an attack, nor, when once engaged, ever surrenders: She is therefore an emblem
of magnanimity and true courage. As if anxious to prevent all pretensions of quarreling
with her, the weapons with which nature has furnished her, she conceals in the roof of
her mouth, so that, to those who are unacquainted with her, she appears to be a most
defenseless animal; and even when those weapons are shown and extended for her
defense, they appear weak and contemptible; but their wounds however small, are
decisive and fatal. Conscious of this, she never wounds 'till she has generously given
notice, even to her enemy, and cautioned him against the danger of treading on her.339
In 1775 the rattlesnake would again be used by Christopher Gadsden, the American statesman and
eventual Brigadier General in the Continental Army, when he designed the “Gadsden Flag” that depicted
the rattlesnake coiled and ready to strike with the words “Don’t Tread on Me” underneath.
This rattlesnake correctly embodies the assertive nationalism within the PRC. China still
exemplifies the “Join or Die,” concept when referring to Taiwan reunification. All parts of the snake
have joined the PRC except Taiwan. And the snake’s policy regarding the unity of China is really that
black-and-white; there is no option for part of the snake to function independently. Taiwan must join to
complete the snake, and Xinjiang and Tibet cannot separate from the snake for fear of the snake’s
death. China’s behavior towards foreign states is perfectly articulated by the Gadsden Flag snake. To
tread can be defined as “to step or walk on or over.”340 China despises foreign “treading” on internal
Chinese affairs, especially foreigners who attempt to tread on Chinese territory. Like a rattlesnake,
China strikes first, yet not without rattling a warning to not tread on its territory. In October 1950 Zhou
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Enlai issued a warning to the Indian ambassador to Peking that if UN forces crossed the Yalu River, China
would intervene. Sure enough UN forces under General MacArthur crossed the Yalu River, prompting
the PLA to cross into North Korea and launch its war with America. The PRC would launch attacks
against India, USSR and Vietnam in response to an increase military presence on its borders.
The Chinese policies consolidation policies towards Xinjiang, Tibet, Hong Kong, Macau and the
neighboring seas are by no means only isolated, regional-specialized policies. Everything converges on
Taiwan. China is still fragmented and Taiwan must be united with the mainland. In Xinjiang and Tibet
China assertively fights separatism out of a fear that territorial loss will weaken China’s claim to Taiwan.
If China was to allow either autonomous region to secede from the PRC, it would allow Taiwan to do the
same. Domino theory is part of this grand-strategy towards Xinjiang, Tibet and Taiwan because if China
allows one of the regions to be free, it is believed the other regions would demand the same. China had
to stay assertive in its negotiations with England over the return of Hong Kong otherwise its claim to
Taiwan would not be taken seriously. With Hong Kong and Macau’s return to China, Beijing has offered
them the ability to function as a special administrative region (Hong Kong’s time as a Special
Administrative Region expires in 2047, Macau’s in 2049) in the hopes that Taiwan would seek to reunify
under the same system. China’s policies towards the South and East China Seas are also driven in part
by the goal of reunification with Taiwan: control of the seas around Taiwan allows China to consolidate
Taiwan by force if need be.
For China, a cohesive territorial consolidation policy demands strong leadership. Xi Jinping has
succeeded Hu Jintao to preside over China’s fifth generation of leadership.341 On November 15, 2012
he assumed office General Secretary of the Central Committee the Chinese Communist Party; on March
14, 2013 he assumed office as the President of the People’s Republic of China and Chairman of the
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People’s Republic of China Central Military Commission. This has allowed him to function as head of the
party, the government and the military. On January 25, 2014 he also assumed leadership as the
Chairman of the newly created National Security Commission. This commission will be structured
similar to the US National Security Council but with a stronger focus on domestic security that combines
foreign and domestic policy.342 As Chairman, Xi Jinping will be able to now conduct foreign and
domestic defense policy with less interference from the seven-member Politburo Standing
Committee.343 This position gives Xi Jinping more power and influence than the two previous leaders of
China Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao. It will make Xi the most powerful Chinese leader since Deng Xiaoping.
Shi Yinhong, an international relations professor at Renmin University stated that the move “makes it
look like Xi Jinping is almost all powerful. He’ll have more power than previous leaders to conduct
foreign policy and security affairs.”344 Certainly this position cements Xi’s power and enables him to
control China’s policy towards territorial consolidation.
Many in the international community fear China’s territorial ambitions. China’s potential to use
force to consolidate its longstanding claim to Taiwan or its current dispute with neighbors regarding the
offshore islands in the South and East China Seas certainly demands attention. China’s rising military
expenditures, especially into its Navy, also demands attention. However this study finds that China is
not aggressively seeking to use force, but fully preparing itself to be able to assert itself if it need me. If
China decides it needs to assert itself it will initiate the conflict through the use of offensive deterrence.
China’s behavior towards Xinjiang, Tibet, Hong Kong and Macau also demand attention as China
continues to fight separatism and commit human rights abuses. To quote Shakespeare, “madness in
great ones must not unwatched go.”345 China, like Hamlet, must be watched because it has the strong
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potential to do so and the assertive mindset to follow through. The international community must
always be vigilant when watching China’s return as a dominant power in East Asia.
This thesis constituted an attempt to understand China’s territorial consolidation and its
implications. It finds that the Qing’s dynasty’s expansion; the memory of territorial loss during the
century of humiliation; Chinese nationalism desire to create a unified state led by ethnic Han’s with its
borders at the maximum extent of Qing governance; the CCP’s legitimacy, being based upon economic
improvement; and the Taiwan’s continual separation from the mainland drive China’s behavior towards
territorial consolidation. For further study I would recommend several topics. First, will China’s attempt
to consolidate its control over Hong Kong and Taiwan lead to some form of democracy on the mainland?
Taiwan clearly values its democratic systems and I believe the China has to offer some democracy on the
mainland to incentivize Taiwan to reunify with the mainland. It would be interesting to study the
prospects for democracy within China and relate it to reunification. Second, would be a study on PRC’s
policy towards overseas Chinese. I believe that being Chinese has a lot to do with ethnicity and
language, so it would be interesting to understand how Beijing treats those who live inside the PRC
different from inside the PRC. Furthermore because this study involves the borders of China, would
China seek to annex territory just across its borders as some Chinese people move settle in other
countries. I would think not, but part of the reason China invaded Vietnam in 1979 was over the
treatment of ethnic Chinese.
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